The inverse market demand in a homogeneous-product Cournot duopoly is P = 200 − 3(Q1 + Q2) and costs are C1(Q1) = 26Q1 and C2(Q2) = 32Q2. a. Determine the reaction function for each firm. b. Calculate each firm’s equilibrium output. c. Calculate the equilibrium market price. d. Calculate the profit each firm earns in equilibrium.

Suppose the iceberg lettuce industry is a Cournot duopoly with two firms: Xtra Leafy (a) and Yummy Farms (y). Xtra Leafy produces q units of output and Yummy Farms produces qy units of output. Aggregate market output is Q = x + y. The (inverse) market demand schedule is: p = 176 - 2Q Both firms have identical cost structures: MC = MC₁ = ATC₂ = ATC₁ = $12 Find Xtra Leafy's Cournot reaction function of the form: 9x = a + bay Where "a" is the reaction function's intercept and "b" is its slope. Note: Please review the formatting instructions above. If any value is negative, be sure to include its negative sign. a. a= b. b = Hint: One of your answers will be negative. Think about why.

Could you answer the red highlighted part please

Consider a Cournot duopoly. The market demand function is P = 112-1(q1 + q2), where P is the market price, q1 is the output produced by Firm 1 and q2 is the output produced by Firm 2. The two firms have a constant marginal cost c = 17. What is Firm 2's profit ? Round your answer to the nearest integer (e.g. 50)

1. marginal costs e, = c, = c, = 20. The inverse demand function is given by P = 100 - Q. where Q = q, + 4: + 93- Consider a market with three firms (i - 1, 2, 3). which have identical a) Identify the reaction functions for each firm and compute the Cournot equilibrium, i.e., the market price and quantity. b) What happens to the market price if all three firms merge compared to part (a)?

The inverse demand for a homogeneous-product Stackelburg duopoly is P=24000-5Q. The cost structures for the leader and the follower respectively are CL(QL)=3000QL and CF(QF)=4000QF.   a) What is the followers reaction function?   b) Determine the equilibrium output level for both the leader and the follower.   Leader output:   Follower output:   c) Determine the equilibrium markert price   $   d) Determine the profits of the leader and the follower.   Leader profits: $   Follower profits: $

C2) Consider an industry with only two firms: firm A and firm B. The industry's inverse demand is P(Q) = 400 - ¹1/Q, 10 where P is the market price and Q is the total industry output. Each firm has a marginal cost of $10. There are no fixed costs and no barriers to exit the market. a) Suppose that the two firms engage in Cournot competition. Find the equilibrium price PNE in the industry, the equilibrium outputs QANE and QBNE, as well as the profits NEA and NEB for each firm. marks] b) Suppose the two firms engage in Stackelberg competition, with firm A moving first, and firm B moving second. Find the equilibrium price PS in the industry, the equilibrium outputs QS and QBS, as well as the profits π and TSB for each firm. в c) For this subquestion only, suppose that firm B has a fixed cost of $200 000: What will firm B's optimal decision be, and what will be the resulting market structure? Now assume that instead of having two firms in the market, we have a monopoly facing the inverse…