PROBLEM IV. Consider an industry consisting of two firms (i = 1,2) that are engaged in a Bertrand price competition. The demand function for the product of firm i is given by q; = 24 – 9p;+ 6pj. The marginal cost of production for each firm is zero. Q12. The collusive price of the products is (а) 4 (b) 5 (c) 1 (d) 6 (e) 2

PROBLEM IV. Consider an industry consisting of two firms (i = 1,2) that are engaged in a Bertrand price competition. The demand function for the product of firm i is given by q; = 24 – 9p;+ 6pj. The marginal cost of production for each firm is zero. Q12. The collusive price of the products is (а) 4 (b) 5 (c) 1 (d) 6 (e) 2

Microeconomic Theory

12th Edition

ISBN:9781337517942

Author:NICHOLSON

Publisher:NICHOLSON

Chapter15: Imperfect Competition

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 15.3P

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