The city council is to decide on a proposal to raise property taxes. Suppose Ms. Tuttle is the chair and the council’s other two members are Mr. Jones and Mrs. Doubtfire. The voting procedure works as follows: Excluding the chair, Mr. Jones and Mrs. Doubtfire simultaneously write down their votes on slips of paper. Each writes either for or against the tax increase. The secretary of the city council then opens the slips of paper and announces the vote tally. If the secretary reports that both slips say for, then the tax increase is implemented and the game is over. If both vote against, then the tax increase is not implemented and, again, the game is over. However, if it is reported that the vote is one for and one against, then Ms. Tuttle has to vote. If she votes for, then the tax increase is implemented, and if she votes against, then it is not. In both cases, the game is then over. As to payoffs, if the tax increase is implemented, then Mrs. Doubtfire and Mr. Jones each receive a payoff of 3. If the tax increase proposal fails, then Mrs. Doubtfire has a payoff of 4 and Mr. Jones’s payoff is 1. As for Ms. Tuttle, she prefers to have a tax increase—believing that it will provide the funds to improve the city’s schools—but would prefer not to be on record as voting for higher taxes. Her payoff from a tax increase when her vote is not required is 5, her payoff from a tax increase when her for vote is required is 2, and her payoff from taxes not being increased is zero (regardless of whether or not she voted). Write down the extensive form of the game composed of Ms. Tuttle, Mr. Jones, and Mrs. Doubtfire.

The city council is to decide on a proposal to raise property taxes. Suppose Ms. Tuttle is the chair and the council’s other two members are Mr. Jones and Mrs. Doubtfire. The voting procedure works as follows: Excluding the chair, Mr. Jones and Mrs. Doubtfire simultaneously write down their votes on slips of paper. Each writes either for or against the tax increase. The secretary of the city council then opens the slips of paper and announces the vote tally. If the secretary reports that both slips say for, then the tax increase is implemented and the game is over. If both vote against, then the tax increase is not implemented and, again, the game is over. However, if it is reported that the vote is one for and one against, then Ms. Tuttle has to vote. If she votes for, then the tax increase is implemented, and if she votes against, then it is not. In both cases, the game is then over. As to payoffs, if the tax increase is implemented, then Mrs. Doubtfire and Mr. Jones each receive a payoff of 3. If the tax increase proposal fails, then Mrs. Doubtfire has a payoff of 4 and Mr. Jones’s payoff is 1. As for Ms. Tuttle, she prefers to have a tax increase—believing that it will provide the funds to improve the city’s schools—but would prefer not to be on record as voting for higher taxes. Her payoff from a tax increase when her vote is not required is 5, her payoff from a tax increase when her for vote is required is 2, and her payoff from taxes not being increased is zero (regardless of whether or not she voted). Write down the extensive form of the game composed of Ms. Tuttle, Mr. Jones, and Mrs. Doubtfire.