ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
14th Edition
ISBN: 9780190931919
Author: NEWNAN
Publisher: Oxford University Press
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- QUESTION 17 ID probabilistic model and safety stock In a safety stock problem where both demand and lead time are variable, demand averages 150 units per day with a daily standard deviation of 16, and lead time averages 5 days with a standard deviation of 1 day. What is the standard deviation of demand during lead time? Ⓒ15 100 154 13,125arrow_forwardConsider the model of competitive insurance discussed in lectures (Topic 6.7). Peter is a risk averse individual with the utility function u(w) = w0.5. His current wealth is $300 and with probability 1/2 he will incur a loss of D = $240, but with probability 1/2 he will incur no loss. Ann has the same utility u(w) = w0.5 and current wealth $300 as Peter, but a different probability of loss: she will incur a loss of D = $240 with probability 0.1, and no loss with probability 0.9. As we showed in lectures, in the separating equilibrium Peter is offered actuarially fair full insurance contract, so his wealth is equal to $180, whether loss happens or not. Ann will be offered an insurance contract with the amount of insurance (approximately) equal to Group of answer choices 0 16 36 66 120 240arrow_forwardV7 Consider a owner-manager problem in which πgross = 2e + ε [manager has control over e, ε are factors outside of manager’s control, ε~N(0,σ2 )] The owner pays the manager a salary of s out of the gross profits. Manager’s cost of effort = e2 /2. Manager has constant risk aversion utility function. σ 2 = 4 A = 1 a) What is the first-best outcome for manager utility, manager effort, and net profits of the owner? b) Now consider that the owner cannot observe manager effort and offers a salary tied to gross profits: s(πgross) = a + b πgross What is the second-best outcome for manager utility, manager effort, and net profits of the owner?arrow_forward
- In the markets for used items, there is a natural inclination for adverse selection. This means- Only high quality items are sold.- All items are sold- Only low quality items are sold - A mix of high and low quality items are sold.arrow_forwardThe governments role in terrorism insurance is that of - disinterested observer - innocent bystander - a reinsurance provider of last resort/ re-insurerarrow_forwardConsider the following information: Patients who are given Treatment A live for one year in Health State q = 0.8 and certainly live for another year in Health State q = 0.5. Patients who are given Treatment B live for one year in Health State q = 1.0 and then either die with probability 70% or live for another year in Health State q = 1.0 with probability !3! 30%. Which of the following statement is TRUE regarding the abovementioned information? If the second year is discounted at rate r= 0.10 then the expected present value QALYS for treatment A and B is 1.35 and 1.33, respectively. O If the second year is discounted at rate r = 0.10, Treatment A and B yield the same more expected present value QALYS. If the second year is discounted at rate r= 0.10, Treatment A yields more expected present value QALYS. If the second year is discounted at rate r = 0.10 then the expected present value QALYS for treatment A and B is 1.25 and 1.27, respectively. O If the second year is discounted at rate…arrow_forward
- Why can a pooling equilibrium be sustained in Spence’s signaling model but not in the Rothschild-Stiglitz screening model? Explain why in both models, the “good” type (high productivity in Spence, or low risk in Rothschild-Stiglitz) lose out in a separating equilibrium.arrow_forwardCalculate absolute and relative risk aversion for U(x)=ln(x) and U(x)=-e-x where wealth is (w)arrow_forwardwhich of the strategies is effective in reducing moral hazard? gatekeeping cost sharing prospective payment all of the abovearrow_forward
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