Suppose there are two farmers, each of whom has the right to graze cows on the village common. Denote by sA and sB the number of cows farmers A and B graze, respectively. The payoff per cow is given by 120-sA-sB and farmers decide on the number of cows they will graze on the common simultaneously   (a) Formulate this situation as a strategic game and find the Nash equilibrium (b) Compare the equilibrium farmer profits to those that would have been realized if each farmer grazed 30 cows on the village common. Explain

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Hello, please help me to solve this Game Theory question. Thanks in advance! Hobby hunter Jack decides what to do the next weekend. He can either stay at home and watch movies (Movies), or call his friend Katherine to go hunting (Hunt). If he stays in, both Jack and Katherine get a payoff of 2. If he decides to hunt, he knows the situation with his friend will resemble a classic stag hunt game with simultaneous moves: Hunting a stag is better than hunting a rabbit, but it only works if they cooperate. The hunting subgame is captured as:     Katherine       Stag Rabbit Jack Stag 3 , 3 0 , 1   Rabbit 1 , 0 1 , 1 Draw the entire game as an extensive form (game tree), capturing both Jack’s initial decision (M or H) and the subsequent hunting game. Make sure to correctly label all players, actions, and information sets.

Use the following payoff matrix for a one-shot game to answer the accompanying questions.         Player 2       Strategy  X Y Player 1  A      30, 30              16, -50 B     -50, 16        50, 50 A. Determine the Nash equilibrium outcomes that arise if the players make decisions independently, simultaneously, and without any communication.  check all that apply (16, −50) (−50, 16) (30, 30) (50, 50) Which of these outcomes would you consider most likely? multiple choice (16, −50) (50, 50) (−50, 16) (30, 30) B. Suppose player 1 is permitted to “communicate” by uttering one syllable before the players simultaneously and independently make their decisions. What should player 1 utter? multiple choice  A or B What outcome do you think would occur as a result? multiple choice  (−50, 16) (16, −50) (30, 30) (50, 50) c. Suppose player 2 can choose its strategy before player 1, that player 1 observes player 2’s choice before making her decision, and that this move structure is…

Suppose a $1 bill is to be divided between two players according to a simultaneous-move, one-shot bargaining game. Is there a Nash equilibrium to the bargaining game if the smallest unit in which the money can be divided is $0.01? Assume that if the players ask for more in total than is available, they go home empty-handed.