Suppose a single firm produces all of the output in a contestable market. Analysts determine that the market inverse demand function is P = 400 -4Q, and the firm’s cost function is C(Q) = 16Q. Determine the firm’s equilibrium price and corresponding profits. Price: $   Profits: $

A market consists of a dominant firm and a number of fringe firms. The followings are the information about these firms. Total market demand: QALL=300 – (2.5) P The competitive fringe supply function (total): QF=2P-12 The dominant firms marginal cost function: MC = 12 + (1⁄2) QD.  a) What is the equilibrium price set by the dominant firm?  b) How much will the competitive fringe supply to the market at the price found in question (a)?        Show the answers graphically.

The second part of the question is the most important one to get an answer to.

The average consumer at a firm with market power has an inverse demand function of P = 10 − Q. The firm's total cost function is C = 2Q. If the firm engages in two-part pricing, what is the optimal price to charge a consumer for each unit purchased?   Multiple Choice   $2   $0   $1   $4

Suppose Neu Train is the only high-speed railway between City A and City B. She operates with a cost function of C = 2,000 + 5Q2 - 500Q. Furthermore, an estimate shows that the inverse market demand for the high- speed railway between the two cities is P = 14,500 – 70Q. Calculate the profit-maximizing output level and the price of Neu Train.

Problem 2: Presently, APlus Transport and Big Movers are the only suppliers of services that haul heavy construction equipment between jobs within the Midwest. No other suppliers have the equipment necessary to perform the service. The market inverse demand for these hauling services is given below. P = 4,030-4Q where P is price per trip and Q is total number of trips per year. For simplicity, also assume that neither firm has fixed costs. From company records, you are given the following variable cost function for each firm: a. C. TVC = 300 TVCB = 80QB b. Calculate the Cournot market equilibrium price-output solutions for each firm including their respective profits. d. Assume these two competitors operate as a two-firm Cournot duopoly. Find the reaction functions for each firm. Suppose Big Movers shuts down operations so that APlus now has a monopoly in this market. What is the price, quantity, and profits for APlus after this change? Summarize the results of your findings over the…