ROWENA 2 Answer 1: 2 Answer 2: 2 Answer 3: 1 Earth Water Answer 4: Wind 3 Fire of the Nash equilibrium, (Rowena's 1 Colin's 3 North 1,3 1,2 3,2 2,0 This simultaneous game has two Nash equilibria. The Nash equilibrium, (Rowena's 2 Colin's South 3,1 1,2 2,1 COLIN 3,0 East 0,2 2,3 1,3 1,1 West 1.1 1,1 0,3 2,2 ) has a greater joint payoff than that

ROWENA 2 Answer 1: 2 Answer 2: 2 Answer 3: 1 Earth Water Answer 4: Wind 3 Fire of the Nash equilibrium, (Rowena's 1 Colin's 3 North 1,3 1,2 3,2 2,0 This simultaneous game has two Nash equilibria. The Nash equilibrium, (Rowena's 2 Colin's South 3,1 1,2 2,1 COLIN 3,0 East 0,2 2,3 1,3 1,1 West 1.1 1,1 0,3 2,2 ) has a greater joint payoff than that

ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

14th Edition

ISBN:9780190931919

Author:NEWNAN

Publisher:NEWNAN

Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 1QTC

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1. Consider the following N-player game. Each agent has a choice of strategy A or B. The state variable is x, the proportion of agents choosing strategy A. For every agent, the utility of choosing strategy A is U(A) = 10 +2x and the utility of choosing strategy B is U(B) = 10+3x. What is the Nash equilibrium to this game? Explain.
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For the game given, use the best-reply method to find the Nash equilibria.
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on Mary, UE, BD UF, AC DF, BC UF, BD DE, AC DE, BC Nancy U D Nancy -5,4 Mary -0,2 -6,2 -2.6 Which of the following answers is a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium in this game? Check all that apply. (Answers below are formatted as Mary's strategy, Nancy's strategy.)
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(The Beckhams' dilemma) Victoria and David are husband and wife. They both prefer ciean to dirty house but neither likes to clean the house. Their payoffs are given in the table below. Victoria Clean Don't clean 0,8 Clean 5,5 David Don't clean 8,0 1,1 a) Let say they play the clean house game only once, what is the Nash equilibrium? b) Let say Victoria and David has to decide whether to clean or not every day for indefinite number of days. How grim-trigger strategy will be our subgame perfect Nash equilibrium? In other words, what is the patience rate that ensure Victoria and David maintain the cleanliness of the house?
Player 1 Up Down [Select] Left 2,4 6,5 Player 2 In the above game, player 1 would play [Select] Right 1,0 4,2 , player 2 would play resulting in a Nash Equilibrium of [Select]
7. Solving for dominant strategies and the Nash equilibrium Suppose Antonio and Caroline are playing a game in which both must simultaneously choose the action Left or Right. The payoff matrix that follows shows the payoff each person will earn as a function of both of their choices. For example, the lower-right cell shows that if Antonio chooses Right and Caroline chooses Right, Antonio will receive a payoff of 9 and Caroline will receive a payoff of 8. Caroline Left Right Left 8, 5 8. 7 Antonio Right 3, 6 9, 8 The only dominant strategy in this game is for to choose The outcome reflecting the unique Nash equilibrium in this game is as follows: Antonio chooses and Caroline chooses
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