QUESTION 4. Consider the following game. Player 1's payoffs are listed first, in bold: P2 W X Y A 200, 300 100, 500 300 3 1 " " B P1 0, 300 0 400 0 500 0, 3 C 20, 300 10, 300 310, 400 50 2 I a. Does either player have any weakly dominant strategies? List it/them or explain why not. b. Does either player have any strictly dominated strategies? If yes, list it/them. C. If the game were played sequentially with Player 1 going first, what is the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium? Z 500

QUESTION 4. Consider the following game. Player 1's payoffs are listed first, in bold: P2 W X Y A 200, 300 100, 500 300 3 1 " " B P1 0, 300 0 400 0 500 0, 3 C 20, 300 10, 300 310, 400 50 2 I a. Does either player have any weakly dominant strategies? List it/them or explain why not. b. Does either player have any strictly dominated strategies? If yes, list it/them. C. If the game were played sequentially with Player 1 going first, what is the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium? Z 500

ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

14th Edition

ISBN:9780190931919

Author:NEWNAN

Publisher:NEWNAN

Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 1QTC

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