Players A and B plan to divide an ice cream. Player A proposes a division ratio, B can either accept or reject it. If B accepts, the game ends and the ice cream is divided as A suggests. If B rejects, he can propose another ration, but then the ice cream melts to half the original size. A can also accept or reject. If A accepts, the ice cream is divided as B suggests. If A rejects, the ice cream melts and nothing is left. Assume that when acceptance and rejection bring the same outcome, A and B will choose to accept. Please find the equilibrium using backward induction.

Harry and Rebecca are working on a joint project. Harry is responsible for the hardware, his choices are between an Apple (A), IBM (B) or Cisco (C). Rebecca will be developing the software choosing between existing software development tools YouCreate (Y) or Zoho Creator (Z). Harry expects her to choose an appropriate software without consulting him. However, YouCreate is incompatible with IBM hardware, but works well with Apple products. Rebecca prefers YouCreate For Apple hardware, otherwise she prefers Zoho Creator. The problem is that Harry has been looking for hardware on his own and has not informed Rebecca which hardware he bought. If Harry bought a Cisco product, it comes with its own software development product. Payoffs are as follows: if Harry bought a Cisco product, they each receive $3, irrespective of the software development tool Rebecca has brought. If Harry bought an apple hardware and Rebecca a YouCreate tool then Rebecca receives $2, and Harry $4. If Rebecca has…

Two friends are deciding where to go for dinner. There are three choices, which we label A, B, and C.   Max prefers A to B to C. Sally prefers B to A to C.   To decide which restaurant to go to, the friends adopt the following procedure:               First, Max eliminates one of three choices.   Then, Sally decides among the two remaining choices.   Thus, Max has three strategies (eliminate A, eliminate B, and eliminate C). For each of those strategies, Sally has two choices (choose among the two remaining).   a.Write down the extensive form (game tree) to represent this game.   b.If Max acts non-strategically, and makes a decision in the first period to eliminate his least desirable choice, what will the final decision be?   c.What is the subgame-perfect equilibrium of the above game?   d. Does your answer in b. differ from your answer in c.? Explain why or why not.   Only typed Answer

Two discount stores (Megastore and Superstore) are interested in expanding their market share through advertising. The table below depicts the strategic outcomes (profits) of both stores with and without advertising. Superstore - Advertise Superstore - Don't Advertise Megastore - Advertise $95, $80 $305, $55 Megastore - Don't Advertise $65, $285 $165, $115 When the game does reach Nash Equilibrium, the payoffs for both stores will be a) Megastore $95 and Superstore $80 b) Megastore $305 and Superstore $55 c) Megastore $65 and Superstore $285 d) Megastore $165 and Superstore $115