Concept explainers
Please explain how Jack and Cody can maxmise utility through living in the same household with a unitary and non-unitary models.
Unitary models - Mutual altruism (or any unitary model)
Non-unitary models - Copertive models - Collective + Bargaining model.(or any Non-unitary models)
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Hi. Thank you. Really good answer to my last question.I left some feedback to show this.
The question also wants a drawing of the two models for each but I'm not sure how, can you please draw one for each?
One for the unitary model, Samuelson's Consensus Model (1956) & the Non-unitary model for the cooperative approach.
Many thanks
Hi. Thank you. Really good answer to my last question.I left some feedback to show this.
The question also wants a drawing of the two models for each but I'm not sure how, can you please draw one for each?
One for the unitary model, Samuelson's Consensus Model (1956) & the Non-unitary model for the cooperative approach.
Many thanks
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