ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
14th Edition
ISBN: 9780190931919
Author: NEWNAN
Publisher: Oxford University Press
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Question
Monte owns a dog; the dog’s barking annoys Monte’s neighbor, Teresa. Suppose that the benefit of owning the dog is worth $200 to Monte and that Teresa bears a cost of $400 from the barking. Assuming Monte has the legal right to keep the dog, a possible private solution to this problem is that
a. |
Teresa pays Monte $150 to give the dog to his parents who live on an isolated farm.
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b. |
Monte pays Teresa $350 for her inconvenience.
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c. |
Teresa pays Monte $300 to give the dog to his parents who live on an isolated farm.
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d. |
There is no private transaction that would improve this situation.
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