ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
14th Edition
ISBN: 9780190931919
Author: NEWNAN
Publisher: Oxford University Press
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Melanie and Oli are competing Pacific halibut fishers. Both have been allocated ITQs that limit their catch to 1,000 tons of Pacific halibut each. Melanie's cost per ton is $20; Oli's cost per ton is $25. Assume that the market price of Pacific halibut is $35 per ton. If Melanie pays Oli $11 per ton for his ITQs and then catches her new limit of 2,000 tons, her profit would be
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