Let G be the following static game. Rose Colin A B A (3,4) (1,5) B (4,2) (0,1) (a) Determine the pure Nash equilibria of G. (b) Rose A, B, Colin A, B is a mixed Nash equilibrium of H. (You do not have to verify this.) Determine the expected payoffs of both players given that they choose their strategies according to this Nash equilibrium. (c) Draw the payoff polygon of H. Indicate on your diagram the points corresponding to the Nash equilibria of H, and the points corresponding to Pareto optimal solu- tions of H.

For problem 1 and 2, consider the following game : с D A (0,5) (5,-5) B (3, 1) (1, 0) 1. Show that the game above doesn't have a pure Nash equilibrium. 2. Show that the game above has a unique mixed Nash equilibrium, and describe the playing strategy.

find all Nash equilibria in this game using von  Neumann-Morgenstern preferences:

Find mixed-strategy Nash equilibria for the following two games.

Player 2 Middle Left P1: $45 P1: $70 Up P2: $45 P2: $50 Player 1 P1: $50 P1: $60 Middle P2: $50 P2: $60 P1: $60 P1: $50 Down P2: $60 P2: $70 In the game shown above, list all of the Nash Equilibrium (please check ALL that apply) (up, left) (up, middle) (up, right) (middle, left) (middle, middle) (middle, right) (down, left) (down, middle) (down, right) No equilibrium Right P1: $45 P2: $60 P1: $50 P2: $70 P1: $60 P2: $60

Switch the payoffs in cells (A, A) and (D, D). What is the pure strategy Nash equilibrium outcome if there is one?

What are the sub games in the following game? Find all subgame perfect Nash equilibria (SPNE)

Find Nash equilibrium using cell by cell inspection

Two rival companies competing in the same market need to decide their plans for future expansion of their stores. The Table below shows the possible outcomes of their mutually interdependent actions (payoffs are profits in £m)     Giga Company Titanic Conglomerate   No Change Refurbishment of existing stores Large Expansion No Change     30, 40      25, 35    15, 24 Refurbishment of existing stores     35, 30      28, 32    18, 33 Large Expansion     12, 22     18, 20    20, 25   The Nash equilibrium:            (A)       does not exist. (B)       occurs when both firms choose Refurbishment of existing stores.              (C)       occurs when both firms choose Large Expansion. (D)       occurs when both firms choose No Change.

Can you help me with the question below? What is [are] the Nash Equilibrium [Equilibria] of this game? A) (10;10) and (20;20) B) (30;30) C) (10;20) and (20;10) D) (20;20) E) (30;30)