ind all Nash equilibria of the following two-player game. Provide ne L M R A 0,0 в 2,-1| 0, 0 с -2,1 | 2, —1| 0,0 -2,1 2, –1 -2, 1 C

This payoff matrix shows a two-player variant of the sushi game, but where B really loves sushi, so her payoffs from getting to eat sushi are higher than A's, and her payoffs from there not being enough sushi are lower than A's. Payoffs are ordered A, B. В A 10, 15 10, 25 20, 15 0, -5 A. Find and state all of the mixed strategy Nash equilibria of the game. If there are multiple equilibria, number them in preparation for answering part "c." B. (From the week 6 lectures) Draw a graph of the expected payoffs for each player. Use these graphs to formulate the decision rule for each player. C. (From the week 6 lectures) Draw a graph of the best replies of the two players. Carefully label each Nash equilibrium.

Derive all Nash equilibria of the following game. a1 b1 a1 2,7 3,2 b1 0,0 4,1

In the 3 x 3 matrix below, what is the Nash equilibrium? Р2 N S E U 6,4 7,3 5, 5 P1 H7,3 3,7 4,6 L 8,2 | 6,4 | 3, 7 Select one: a. U,E b. 8,2 О с. 5,5 O d. L,N

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How can I solve questions 3 and 4?

4. Consider a two player game with Fred and Barney, who tal turns removing matchsticks from a pile. They start with 33 matchsticks, and Fred goes first. On each turn, ecach player may remove either one, two, three, four, or five matchsticks. The player to remove the last matchstick wins the game. What are the optimal strategies for each player? Who will win? b. Suppose now that they can remove up to six matchsticks, how will the optimal strategies change for- each player? a.

1. Consider the following game. 21 Player 1 U D Player 2 LR 2,4 4,2 6,2 2,4 ium. thi c) Are there any pure strategy Nash equilibria in this sequential game?

Please correct answer and don't use hend raiting

Please help with two images Just the answer