In trying to solve for the Cournot - Nash equilibrium, given (",") = R₁ (2) = 60-2 60-2 and (v) = R₂₁ = solve for y, . Answer: 45-1 2 C In trying to solve for the Cournot-Nash equilibrium, given (y) R₁(y)=60-y and = (y) R₂(y)= 45-y solve for y 2 Answer:

Please answer clearly through 1. i to iv.

What is Nash equilibrium

Not use ai please

Which of the following DOES NOT accurately describe a Nash equilibrium? O It is the set of strategies which provides the players with the highest possible combined payoffs. All of these choices accurately describe a Nash equilibrium. O It is a set of strategies such that no player can receive a higher payoff by changing only their own strategy. It is a set of strategies such that no player, after seeing what the other players' strategies were, regrets their choice of strategy. It is a set of strategies such that every player, after seeing what the other players' strategies were, is satisfied (if not actually happy) with their choice of strategy.

Consider the following extensive form game: Find the Nash equilibrium Find subgame perfect Nash Equilibrium Explain why all Nash equilibriums are not subgame perfect

True or False?Please Explain Thoroughly: In a Nash equilibrium of a strategic game, each player must best respond to her opponents’ actions, therefore, no other action profile can be unanimously preferredby all the players to a Nash equilibrium.

Q3 Consider the following three-player normal form game (Player 3 is the page player): Player 3 A в Player 2 Player 2 A в A B 1,2, 3 в 2,3,1 Player 1 A Player 1 A 2, 1, 3 3, 2, 1 3, 2, 1 1,2, 3 в 1,3, 2 3, 1,2 For each player, strategies are A and B. a) Find the pure strategy Nash equilibrium of the above game. Assume now that the above game is played sequentially, with Player 3 moving first, Player 1 moving second, and Player 2 moving third. b) Write down the game tree. c) For each player, list all the available pure strategies. d) Find the subgame perfect equilibrium outcome and compare it with the equilibrium outcome you found in subquestion a). Comment.

ROWENA 2 Answer 1: 2 Answer 2: 2 Answer 3: 1 Earth Water Wind Answer 4: Fire of the Nash equilibrium, (Rowena's 1 Colin's 3 3 North 1.3 This simultaneous game has two Nash equilibria. The Nash equilibrium, (Rowena's 2 , Colin's 1,2 3,2 2,0 COLIN South 3,1 1,2 2,1 3,0 East 0,2 2,3 1,1 West 1.1 1,1 0,3 2,2 ) has a greater joint payoff than that

Only economics experts can do rush please asp solve it