Imperfect Cartel vs Perfect Cartel What is the difference between these two and how do they function

14. Aside from advertising, how can monopolisticallycompetitive firms increase demand for their products? 17. Would you expect the kinked demand curve to bemore extreme (like a right angle) or less extreme (like anormal demand curve) if each firm in the cartel producesa near-identical product like OPEC and petroleum?What if each firm produces a somewhat differentproduct? Explain your reasoning.

3. There are two chicken fried steak restaurants operating in a small west Texas town: Cow Tipper Café and Steak to the Heart Diner. Once a month they have to send their new menus to the printer when they have to decide on whether or not to charge a high price or a low price for a chicken fried steak dinner. Once their menus are printed, they can't change their pricing. Since the two restaurants use separate printing companies, each restaurant's pricing decision remains secret until the printed menus are delivered. The payoff matrix for the restaurants is below; the first entry in each cell is Cow Tipper Café's daily profit and the second entry is Steak to the Heart Diner's daily profit. Cow Tipper Café High Price Low Price Steak to the Heart Diner Low Price $350, $300 $450, $400 High Price $500, $350 $375, $475 a. What market structure do these two firms operate in? Explain your answer. b. If Steak to the Heart Diner chooses a high price, what pricing option is better for Cow Tipper…

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4. Imagine a market with demand P = 420 – Q in each period. Two firms are thinking about colluding. They each have cost C(Qi) = 60Qi. If they cooperate and behave as a monopoly, then they have a marginal revenue curve, MRm = 420 – 2Q, and a marginal cost curve, MCm = 60. If they are in a cartel, then the firms will split the monopoly production and profits. If they compete, then they face MRi = 420 – 2Qi – Q-I and MCi = 60. a. If the firms stick to their agreement (cooperate), how much per-period profit do they each make? b. If they are not able to maintain their agreement (compete), what is their per-period profit? c. If one firm cheats on their agreement (deviate), how much does each firm make? Be sure to specify both the profit for the cheater and the firm cheated-on. d. Suppose the firms assume that their interaction will last forever (r = 1) and they share the common discount value R. What is the lowest value of R such that both firms are willing to continue with the cartel…

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G The formula t xC Where Does X b My Questions X BC Broward C cmillanlearning.com/sac/5078081#/5078081/12/-1 Completed 16 out of 20 Question 13 of 20 > Which of these will contribute to a cartel's stability? O a copyright Obrand differentiation O ease of entry into an industry O having few members with similar goals Rain 五0