Give an example, real or imaginary, of a moral hazard problem. Again, your example must clearly point out: what information is private/asymmetric (is it an attribute or an action?) which party has the private information when does the information asymmetry arise (before or after the contract/transaction?) what is the likely outcome and in which way it can be inefficient

Give an example, real or imaginary, of a moral hazard problem. Again, your example must clearly point out: what information is private/asymmetric (is it an attribute or an action?) which party has the private information when does the information asymmetry arise (before or after the contract/transaction?) what is the likely outcome and in which way it can be inefficient

Exploring Economics

8th Edition

ISBN:9781544336329

Author:Robert L. Sexton

Publisher:Robert L. Sexton

Chapter8: Market Failure

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 10P

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Give an example, real or imaginary, of an adverse selection problem. Your example must clearly point out: what information is private/asymmetric (is it an attribute or an action?) which party has the private information when does the information asymmetry arise (before or after the contract/transaction?) what is the likely outcome and in which way it can be inefficient
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