We now want to understand how to measure the impact of the policy. If the policy is effective in reducing driving, then pollution should go down. In the model, we captured the effect of the choice of transportation on pollution with the function C(x₁, x₂). In practice, the actual reduction in pollution can only be known after the policy is imple- mented.

John and Sotiris live on trees in two different forests. They each have eight hours to work in a day. John can grow a Yam in 1 hour or raise a Zebra in 2 hours. Sotiris can grow a Yam in 2 hours or raise a Zebra in 4 hours. Both John and Sotiris consume equal numbers of Yams and Zebras. When calculating the welfare benefits of markets, the standard analysis only includes the parties involved in exchange. Using the American Opioid Crisis as an example, explain how poorly regulated markets can cause harm to third parties not involved in exchange.

Consider the market for trees in a public park. These trees are a public good that give benefits to multiple groups of people, as described below. Each Marginal Willingness to Pay curve represents the aggregation of all the individuals in that group, and those groups make decisions collectively. Additionally, the cost of planting trees is given. Consider Q to be the number of trees in the park. Note that no one is ever worse off from additional trees.   Arborists: MWTP = 2000 – 5Q                                  Total WTP = 2000Q - 2.5Q2 Environmentalists: MWTP = 1500 – 10Q                 Total WTP = 1500Q – 5Q2 Casual Park Visitors: MWTP = 800 – 10Q                Total WTP = 800Q – 5Q2 Park Haters: MWTP = 500 – 50Q                              Total WTP = 500Q – 25Q2 MC = 1400                                                                  Total Cost = 1400Q   (a) If the government does not intervene into the market, how many trees will be planted? (b) What is the socially…

In a hypothetical country, the government introduces a new policy aimed at combating global warming. As part of this policy, they impose a carbon tax of $20 per ton of CO2 emissions on industries. Prior to the tax, the country's industrial sector emits 800,000 tons of CO2 annually. After the implementation of the tax, the industrial sector reduces its emissions to 600,000 tons of CO2 annually. Calculate the following: The reduction in CO2 emissions as a result of the carbon tax. The total revenue collected by the government from the carbon tax. If the government uses all the revenue collected from the carbon tax to subsidize renewable energy projects, and each project receives $25,000, how many projects can be funded with the total revenue? (Note: Assume no other external factors influencing CO2 emissions, and all calculations are based on the data provided.)

QD1 = 12-4P1 + P2, QS1 = 3+2P1-5P2. solve for P equilibrium and Q equilibrium

Consider two groups of citizens, each group can either choose to drive x = d or to take public transport x = p. The first group, group 1, enjoys driving and has the following 3 benefit from using their car within the ULEZ area: B1(x1 = d) = 18. The second group, group 2, does not enjoy driving and has a benefit of B2(x2 = d) = 0 from driving their car. If they don’t drive, citizens can use public transport to get around. The benefit of doing so is the same for both groups: B1(x1 = p) = B2(x2 = p) = 10. Both groups drive cars that do not meet the ULEZ requirements and therefore create excessive pollution.    For simplicity, we consider that pollution, and the health problems it induces, are the main cost of driving. This cost is imposed on both groups and is equal to Ci(x1 = d, x2 = d) = 10 if both groups drive, Ci(x1 = p, x2 = d) = Ci(x1 = d, x2 = p) = 5 if only one group drives and Ci(x1 = p, x2 = p) = 0 if neither group drives, where i represents either group 1 or group 2. The…

Consider two groups of citizens, each group can either choose to drive x = d or to take public transport x = p. The first group, group 1, enjoys driving and has the following 3 benefit from using their car within the ULEZ area: B1(x1 = d) = 18. The second group, group 2, does not enjoy driving and has a benefit of B2(x2 = d) = 0 from driving their car. If they don’t drive, citizens can use public transport to get around. The benefit of doing so is the same for both groups: B1(x1 = p) = B2(x2 = p) = 10. Both groups drive cars that do not meet the ULEZ requirements and therefore create excessive pollution.    For simplicity, we consider that pollution, and the health problems it induces, are the main cost of driving. This cost is imposed on both groups and is equal to Ci(x1 = d, x2 = d) = 10 if both groups drive, Ci(x1 = p, x2 = d) = Ci(x1 = d, x2 = p) = 5 if only one group drives and Ci(x1 = p, x2 = p) = 0 if neither group drives, where i represents either group 1 or group 2. The…

As of May, 2021; 40% of the COVID-19 vaccines administered globally have gone to people in 27 wealth nations that represent only 11% of the global population. Amidst this vaccine inequality in the backdrop of the pandemic in the world, every country should have the right to make its own vaccine. That's the principle, underpinning the campaign to temporarily waive Intellectual Property (IP) protection on coronavirus vaccines. (a) Suppose the IP is waived (the know-how is available to everyone) and Bangladesh can make its own vaccine. Using the theories of demand-supply and market, discuss the impact of this scenario on the price, quantity, profit margins of the vaccine producing firms, consumers' surplus, producers' surplus in the COVID-19 vaccine market of Bangladesh. (b) Suppose the Government of Bangladesh imposes a per-unit tax on the vaccines sold by "B". Who will bear most of this tax burden and why? (c) If the IP is not waived and only one company "B" is approved for producing…

Suppose a US medical board is using marginal analysis to determine the optimal screening frequency for a specific disease. Below is the approximate number of early cases detected as you expand testing to a broarder population. Suppose further that each early detection case is considered to have a benefit of $50,000 and the cost of screening one person is $20,000. Number of people Total Number of screened in a Early Detection given a year Cases 1,000 500 2,000 1000 3,000 1400 4,000 1700 5,000 1900 The marginal benefit to screening 2 thousand people is, and 3 thousand people is 500 early detection cases ($25,000,000); 400 cases ($20,000,000) 1000 early detection cases ($50,000,000); 1400 ($70,000,000) early cases O 1400 ($70,000,000) early cases; 1000 early detection cases ($50,000,000) 400 cases ($20,000,000); 500 early detection cases ($25,000,000) P

Consider two groups of citizens, each group can either choose to drive x = d or to take public transport x = p. The first group, group 1, enjoys driving and has the following benefit from using their car within the ULEZ area: B1(x1 = d) = 18. The second group, group 2, does not enjoy driving and has a benefit of B2(x2 = d) = 0 from driving their car. If they don’t drive, citizens can use public transport to get around. The benefit of doing so is the same for both groups: B1(x1 = p) = B2(x2 = p) = 10. Both groups drive cars that do not meet the ULEZ requirements and therefore create excessive pollution. For simplicity, we consider that pollution, and the health problems it induces, are the main cost of driving. This cost is imposed on both groups and is equal to Ci(x1 = d, x2 = d) = 10 if both groups drive, Ci(x1 = p, x2 = d) = Ci(x1 = d, x2 = p) = 5 if only one group drives and Ci(x1 = p, x2 = p) = 0 if neither group drives, where i represents either group 1 or group 2. The utility of…