Consider two Cournot oligopolists, firm 1 and firm 2, in a homogenous product market. The market demand is P = 100 - 3Q and each firm has a constant marginal cost MC=10. The market price of equilibrium and total quantity in the market is: Select one: a. P* 30 and Q* = 20 O b. P* 40 and Q* = 20 ○ c. P* = 40 and Q* = 30 O d. P*20 and Q* = 30

Consider two Cournot oligopolists, firm 1 and firm 2, in a homogenous product market. The market demand is P = 100 - 3Q and each firm has a constant marginal cost MC=10. The market price of equilibrium and total quantity in the market is: Select one: a. P* 30 and Q* = 20 O b. P* 40 and Q* = 20 ○ c. P* = 40 and Q* = 30 O d. P20 and Q = 30

ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

14th Edition

ISBN:9780190931919

Author:NEWNAN

Publisher:NEWNAN

Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 1QTC

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