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Consider a used car market with asymmetric information. The owners of used cars know what their vehicles are worth but have no way of credibly demonstrating those values to potential buyers.
Thus, potential buyers must always worry that the used car they are being offered may be a low quality “lemon.”
a. Suppose that there are equal numbers of good and bad used cars in the market and that good used cars are worth $13,000 while bad used cars are worth $5,000. What is the average value of a used car?
b. By how much does the average value exceed the value of a bad used car? By how much does the value of a good used car exceed the average value?
c. Would a potential seller of a good used car be willing to accept the average value as payment for her vehicle?
d. If a buyer negotiates with a seller to purchase the seller’s used car for a price equal to the average value, is the car more likely to be good or bad?
e. Will the used-car market come to feature mostly—if not exclusively—lemons? How much will used cars end up costing if all the good cars are withdrawn?
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- In Hayward, there are 100 people who want to sell their used cars. Everybody knows that 50 of these cars are "lemons" and 50 of these cars are "peaches." The problem is that nobody except the original owners know which are which. Owners of lemons will be happy to get rid of their cars for any price greater than $200. Owners of peaches will be willing to sell them for any price greater than $1,500 but will keep them if they can't get $1,500. There are a large number of buyers who would be willing to pay $2,500 for a peach but would pay only $300 for a lemon. When these buyers are not sure of the quality of the car they buy, they are willing to pay the expected value of the car, given the knowledge they have. If all 100 used cars in Hayward were for sale, how much would buyers be willing to pay for a used car? Type the number without the thousands separator or $ sign.arrow_forwardQuestion 20arrow_forwardHow does the presence of asymmetric information in the used car market impact the behavior of buyers, sellers, and market outcomes?arrow_forward
- Consider a market in which there are many potential buyers and sellers of used cars. Each potential seller has one car, which is either of high quality (a plum) or low quality (a lemon). A seller with a low-quality car is willing to sell it for $4,500, whereas a seller with a high-quality car is willing to SAL sell it for $8,500. A buyer is willing to pay $5,500 for a low- quality car and $10,500 for a high-quality car. Of course, only the seller knows whether a car is of high or low quality, as illustrated in the accompanying image: Suppose that 85% of sellers have low-quality cars. Assume buyers know that 85% of sellers have low-quality cars but are unable to determine the quality of individual cars. If all sellers offer their cars for sale and buyers have no way of determining whether a car is a high-quality plum or a low-quality lemon, the expected value of a car to a buyer is $ (Hint: The expected value of a car is the sum of the probability of getting a low-quality car multiplied…arrow_forwardPlease find the attached question.arrow_forwardSuppose that there are equal numbers of good and bad used cars in the market. Good used cars are worth $13,000, and bad used cars are worth $5,000. What is the average value of a used car? $arrow_forward
- In the used-car market there are good cars and bad cars. Everyone knows that half of the used cars are good and half of them are bad, but only the owner knows exactly whether his particular car is good or bad. If a car is good, it is worth $3000 to its owner but worth $4000 to a potential buyer. A bad car, on the other hand, is worth only $2000 to its owner and $1000 to a potential buyer. A potential buyer has no way of telling whether a particular car is good or bad. However, she is aware of the fact that the seller knows the car's quality. (VI.1) If the price of a car is $2500, what type of car will be offered for sale? Only bad cars/ All cars/ Only good cars/ No car. (choose the right answer) Should a potential buyer buy a car that is being offered for sale at $2500? Yes/ No (choose the right answer) If the price of a car is $3500, what type of car will be offered for sale? Only bad cars/ Only good cars/ All cars/ No car. (choose the right answer) What is the buyer's expected value…arrow_forward19-3. You sell bicycle theft insurance. If bicycle owners do not know whether they are high or low risk consumers. there an adverse selection problem?arrow_forwardAlana wishes to obtain auto insurance. She wants 100/300/100 liability coverage, $250 deductible collision and full coverage comprehensive. She lives in territory 2 and has been assigned to driver class 2 with a rating factor of 1.25. Based on Table 19-6 and Table 19-7, what would be her total premium, if her three-year-old car were in model class L? (Round your answer to the nearest cent.) a. $355.00 b. $365.00 c. $456.25 d. $465.38arrow_forward
- In Hayward, there are 100 people who want to sell their used cars. The problem is that nobody except the original owners know which are which. Owners of lemons will be happy to get rid of their cars for any price greater than $200. Owners of peaches will be willing to sell them for any price greater than $1,500 but will keep them if they can't get $1,500. There are a large number of buyers who would be willing to pay $2,500 for a peach but would pay only $300 for a lemon. When these buyers are not sure of the quality of the car they buy, they are willing to pay the expected value of the car, given the knowledge they have. What is the minimum probability for a used car to be a peach such that peaches stay in the market? Ő O 0.33 0.67 0.55 0.5arrow_forwardHow might adverse selection make it difficult for an insurance market to operate?arrow_forwardDon't use pen or paperarrow_forward
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