Consider a two good, two individual endowment economy. Suppose that individual A's endowment is given by (e^, e^) and individual B's endowment is given by (e̱e, e³). Also assume individual A's preferences are given by: and individual B's preferences are given by: UA (xA, YA) = a log(xд) + (1 − a) log(YA) UB (XB,YB) = log(xB) + (1 − y) log(YB). Consider the following social welfare function: O AUA (xA, YA) + BUB (XB,YB) · We can interpret this as a social planner that wishes to allocate the economy's endowment between the two individuals. ¿ is descriptive of how important individual i is to the social planner, i = {A, B}. Therefore, a large value of 0; indicates to us that the social planner gives a lot of weight to individual i, while the reverse is true if 0; is small. The social planner's problem is to maximize society's welfare by allocating consumption among the two individuals. The solution will be a Pareto optimum. We can obtain all possible Pareto optima by varying the weights of the problem.

ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
14th Edition
ISBN:9780190931919
Author:NEWNAN
Publisher:NEWNAN
Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions
Section: Chapter Questions
Problem 1QTC
icon
Related questions
Question

Write down the Planner’s problem, as well as the Lagrangian. (Hint: There should be two constraints because aggregate consumption of each good cannot exceed the economy’s endowment.) Label the multipliers ϕ1 and ϕ2.

What are the first order conditions of the Planner’s problem? (Hint: There should be 6.).

Find the solution to the Planner’s problem and label the quantities (xpA; ypA) and (xpB; ypB).

If we compare the first order conditions of the Planner’s problem to the first order conditions of a corresponding competitive equilibrium (CE), we can obtain a relationship between ϕx, ϕy, λ, px, and py so that the CE and the Planner’s problem give us the same solution. This is called decentralizing the Planner’s problem.
Decentralize the Planner’s problem. (find the equilibrium prices and the value of λ so that the two problems have the same solution.) 

Can you relate this to the two welfare theorems?

Consider a two good, two individual endowment economy. Suppose that individual A's endowment is given
by (e^, e^) and individual B's endowment is given by (e̱e, e³). Also assume individual A's preferences are
given by:
and individual B's preferences are given by:
UA (xA, YA) = a log(xд) + (1 − a) log(YA)
UB (XB,YB) = log(xB) + (1 − y) log(YB).
Consider the following social welfare function:
O AUA (xA, YA) + BUB (XB,YB) ·
We can interpret this as a social planner that wishes to allocate the economy's endowment between the two
individuals. ¿ is descriptive of how important individual i is to the social planner, i = {A, B}. Therefore,
a large value of 0; indicates to us that the social planner gives a lot of weight to individual i, while the
reverse is true if 0; is small. The social planner's problem is to maximize society's welfare by allocating
consumption among the two individuals. The solution will be a Pareto optimum. We can obtain all possible
Pareto optima by varying the weights of the problem.
Transcribed Image Text:Consider a two good, two individual endowment economy. Suppose that individual A's endowment is given by (e^, e^) and individual B's endowment is given by (e̱e, e³). Also assume individual A's preferences are given by: and individual B's preferences are given by: UA (xA, YA) = a log(xд) + (1 − a) log(YA) UB (XB,YB) = log(xB) + (1 − y) log(YB). Consider the following social welfare function: O AUA (xA, YA) + BUB (XB,YB) · We can interpret this as a social planner that wishes to allocate the economy's endowment between the two individuals. ¿ is descriptive of how important individual i is to the social planner, i = {A, B}. Therefore, a large value of 0; indicates to us that the social planner gives a lot of weight to individual i, while the reverse is true if 0; is small. The social planner's problem is to maximize society's welfare by allocating consumption among the two individuals. The solution will be a Pareto optimum. We can obtain all possible Pareto optima by varying the weights of the problem.
Expert Solution
steps

Step by step

Solved in 1 steps with 7 images

Blurred answer
Similar questions
  • SEE MORE QUESTIONS
Recommended textbooks for you
ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
Economics
ISBN:
9780190931919
Author:
NEWNAN
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
Principles of Economics (12th Edition)
Principles of Economics (12th Edition)
Economics
ISBN:
9780134078779
Author:
Karl E. Case, Ray C. Fair, Sharon E. Oster
Publisher:
PEARSON
Engineering Economy (17th Edition)
Engineering Economy (17th Edition)
Economics
ISBN:
9780134870069
Author:
William G. Sullivan, Elin M. Wicks, C. Patrick Koelling
Publisher:
PEARSON
Principles of Economics (MindTap Course List)
Principles of Economics (MindTap Course List)
Economics
ISBN:
9781305585126
Author:
N. Gregory Mankiw
Publisher:
Cengage Learning
Managerial Economics: A Problem Solving Approach
Managerial Economics: A Problem Solving Approach
Economics
ISBN:
9781337106665
Author:
Luke M. Froeb, Brian T. McCann, Michael R. Ward, Mike Shor
Publisher:
Cengage Learning
Managerial Economics & Business Strategy (Mcgraw-…
Managerial Economics & Business Strategy (Mcgraw-…
Economics
ISBN:
9781259290619
Author:
Michael Baye, Jeff Prince
Publisher:
McGraw-Hill Education