Assume that Mary’s utility function is U(W) = W1/3, where W is wealth. Suppose that Mary has an initial level of wealth of $27,000. How much of a risk premium would she require to participate in a gamble that has a 50% probability of raising her wealth to $29,791 and a 50% probability of lowering her wealth to $24,389?

You are a risk-averse investor with a CRRA utility function. You are faced with the decision to invest your total wealth W of £1,000,000 into a riskless asset which generates a return of 5% or into a risky asset which either generates a return of 20% or a loss of −4% with equal probability. Find the optimal investment allocation with a coefficient of relative risk aversion η=2, and comment on your results.

Let W0 represents an individual’s current wealth and U(W) is this individual’s von Neumann-Morgenstern utility index (or utility function) that reflects how s/he feels about various levels of wealth. Assume this individual marginal utility of wealth decreases a wealth increases. Which of the following statements is true?   a. This individual will prefer to keep his or her current wealth rather than taking a fair gamble.   b. For this individual, a 50-50 chance of winning or losing c dollars yields less expected utility than does refusing the bet.   c. This individual is said to be risk averse.   d. All of the above.

!

An investor has a power utility function with a coefficient of relative risk aversion of 3. Compare the utility that the investor would receive from a certain income of £2 with that generated by a lottery having equally likely outcomes of £1 and £3. Calculate the certain level of income which, for an investor with preferences as above, would generate identical expected utility to the lottery described. How much of the original certain income of £2 the investor would be willing to pay to avoid the lottery? Detail the calculations and carefully explain your answer.

Janet's broad attitude to risk (risk averse, risk neutral, or risk loving) is independent of her wealth. She has initial wealth w and is offered the opportunity to buy a lottery ticket. If she buys it, her final wealth will be either w + 4 or w – 2, each equally likely. She is indifferent between buying the ticket and not buying it. Janet offers her friend Sam (who has identical preferences and initial wealth) the following proposition: They buy the ticket together, and share the cost and proceeds equally. Sam has another idea: They buy two tickets (that have independent outcomes) and share the costs and proceeds equally. Which of the following statements is true? O a. There are risk averse expected utility maximisers who would prefer Janet's idea to Sam's idea. O b. Any expected utility maximiser whose utility is a strictly increasing function of wealth would prefer Sam's idea to Janet's idea. O c. Any risk averse expected utility maximiser would prefer Sam's idea to Janet's idea. O…

For constants a and b, 0 < b, b  1, and expected profit E(p), the expected utility function of a person who is risk-neutral can be written as E(U) = Which one: a+b^p a + (E(p))^b. a - bE(p). a + bE(p). a + (E(p))^(-b).

Abigail is a consumer whose utility is a function of her total wealth W.            u(W ) = log W. Suppose that Abigail begins with initial wealth of A = 100 but will suffer a serious illness with probability π = 0.15 which will require extensive treatment costing L = 80. To hedge against this risk, Abigail considers buying a health insurance policy. She may buy as much insurance I as she wishes at a cost of p per dollar of coverage, so her payoffs in each state are     Healthy Ill Probability 0.85 0.15 No Insurance 100 20 Claim 0 I Premium −pI −pI   a) Show that Abigail is risk averse. b) Suppose that the insurance premiums are actuarially fair so that p = 0. Find Abigail’s expected wealth E[W ] and expected utility E[u(W )] as functions of how much insurance she buys I. c) How much insurance should Abigail buy?

Need the right answer among choices and also an explanation of the answer.

Veer