appose the two countries form a OA. The cooperative equilibrium is for Saudi Arabia to produce a high output and Kuwait to produce a high output. O B. A cooperative equilibrium does not exist for this game. $125 $75 Low Output O C. The cooperative equilibrium is for Saudi Arabia to produce a low output and Kuwait to produce a high output. $8 $13 Saudi Arabia O D. The cooperative equilibrium is for Saudi Arabia to produce a high output and Kuwait to produce a low output. $98 $70 E. The cooperative equilibrium is for Saudi Arabia to broduce a low output and Kuwait to produce a low output. High Output $5 $8 What is the Nash equilibrium for this game? O A. The Nash equilibrium is for Saudi Arabia to produce a high output and Kuwait to produce a low output. O B. The Nash equilibrium is for Saudi Arabia to produce a low output and Kuwait to produce a low output. O C. The Nash equilibrium is for Saudi Arabia to produce a high output and Kuwait to produce a high output. S O D. The Nash equilibrium is for Saudi Arabia to produce a low output and Kuwait to produce a high output. S OE. A Nash equilibrium does not exist for this game. Clear all

Part 1 Consider the following game between two early settlers in the United States: Settler 2 Move West Move North Move West 60, 110 100, 140 Settler 1 90, 100 Move North 70, 130 Which of the following is true? Choose one: O A. Both settlers have the same dominant strategy: move west. O B. Neither settler has a dominant strategy. O C.Only settler 1 has a dominant strategy. O D. Both settlers have the same dominant strategy: move north. O E. Only settler 2 has a dominant strategy. Part 2 Considering the payoff matrixin the game above, Choose one: O A there are two equilibria, when one moves west the other moves north (and vice versa). O B. there are no equilibria. O C there is one equilibrium, for both to move north. O D. there is one equilibrium, for both to move west.

A large share of intrafirm trade suggests O There are increasing returns to trade in the industry. O The industry produces a highly differentiated, knowledge-intensive product. O Offshoring is important in the industry. O Strong comparative advantages.

Suppose Tom, Mary and Jill have apartments in the same building, and installing a security system for their building costs $750. Tom is willing to pay $100 for the security system, Mary is willing to pay $300 and Jill is willing to pay $300. If the three of them hold a vote on whether to install the system and split the cost equally, how will the vote go? O Nobody would vote yes O Only one would vote yes Only two would vote yes All three would vote yes

QUESTION 8 Question 3b- 5 Trade triangles of the partner and the home country in a two-country analysis are congruent because: O Trading prices (Px/Py) are different for each country. O Exports of the home country are imports of the parther country. O Trading prices (Px/Py) are lower for each country. The general equilibrium condition is met by both countries.

In the game below, there are two equilibriums: both players play conserve or both players play plunder. If the game is repeated multiple times, players can maintain equilibrium in which conserve is played if: Player 2 Player 1 Conserve Plunder Select one: a. Conserve 100, 100 50,-100 Plunder -100, 50 0,0 Game is repeated many times and discount rates are high O b. Game is repeated few times and discount rates are low O c. Game is repeated few times and discount rates are high O d. Game is repeated many times and discount rates are low

True/False - One of the primary reasons that President Clinton provided a loan guarantee for Mexico worth $20 billion is because Mexico was an important trading partner. O True O False Show Transcribed Text Who benefits from an import tariff? the government O everyone O consumers O foreign producers Show Transcribed Text O True 3 True/False - Tariffs are generally pro-consumer and anti-producer. False Ĉ

Enter The payoffs are represented in the game tree illustrated in the figure to the right What is the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium? -(450,125 Rival Small O A. The game does not have a Nash equililbrium. O B. The Nash equilibrium is for the incumbent produce the large quantity and for the rival to only enter if the (900,0) Don't enter incumbent produces the small quantity. Incumbent Enter OC. The Nash equilibrium is for the incumbent to produce the large quantity and for the rival to not enter regardless of the incumbent's quantity. (400, -2 Large Rival O D. The Nash equilibrium is for the incumbent produce the small quantity and for the rival to only enter if the incumbent produces the small quantity. (800,0) Don't enter O E. The Nash equilibrium is for the incumbent to produce the large quantity and for the rival to enter regardless of the incumbent's quantity.

6) Consider the following signaling game: 20, 5 0,0 10, -10 -10,0 Left Left Right Right Player 2 Player 2 1-a Up Up Nature Player 1-A Player 1-B Туре А — 50% Туре В — 50% Down Down Player 2 1-B Player 2 Left Right Left Right 10,5 0,0 5, -10 0,0 Let's see if it has a pooling equilibrium. Follow the following steps: a. Specify strategies of a possible pooling equilibrium b. Determine player 2’s on-path beliefs for the belief probabilities a and ß as appropriate. You can infer these beliefs from what we know about beliefs in pooling equilibria, and do not have fully calculate them. c. Check whether either player wants to deviate. Is there a pooling equilibrium? d. Determine the off-path beliefs that make the equilibrium hold.

not use ai please