An author is trying to choose between two publishing companies that are competing for the marketing rights to her new novel. Company A has offered the author $10,000 plus $2 per book sold. Company B has offered the author $2,000 plus $4 per book sold. The author believes that four levels of demand for the book are possible are: 1,000, 2,000, 3000 and 5000 books are sold. If the probabilities of each level of demand are as follows: Demand Probability 1000 0.31 2000 0.32 3000 0.25 5000 0.12 Construct the payoff table for each level of demand for company X and company Y. What are the expected monetary value (EMV) and expected opportunity loss (EOL)? Hence determine the best decision that this author should do.

Soft selling occurs when a buyer is skeptical of the usefulness of a product and the seller offers to set a price that depends on realized value. For example, suppose a sales representative is trying to sell a company a new accounting system that will, with certainty, reduce costs by 10%. However, the customer has heard this claim before and believes there is only a 20% chance of actually realizing that cost reduction and a 80% chance of realizing no cost reduction. Assume the customer has an initial total cost of $200. According to the customer's beliefs, the expected value of the accounting system, or the expected reduction in cost, is $____   .   Suppose the sales representative initially offers the accounting system to the customer for a price of $12.00. The information asymmetry stems from the fact that the ______(sales rep or buyer)    has less information about the efficacy of the accounting system than does the  ______(sales rep or buyer)   . At this price, the…

Consider the following interaction between a student and a company. The student is either serious or lazy with probabilities 1/3 and 2/3 respectively. The student knows if they are serious or not, but the company does not. Initially, the student decides whether to revise for exams or not. Revising has a cost of 1 for a serious student and 3 for a lazy one. The company observes the student's exam result (that is, whether they have made the effort to revise), and based on this, offers a salary of 3 (for a serious student) or 1 (for a lazy student). The student learns of the proposed salary and can then either accept (and earn the salary) or refuse (and earn O). They also lose the revision effort if they worked. The company's gain is equal to the student's productivity (4 if they are serious, 2 if not) minus the salary if the student accepts the offer, and O otherwise. 1. Represent the game in extensive form. 2. Show that the game has a unique perfect Bayesian Equilibrium, and provide the…

The ultimatum game is a game in economic experiments. The first player (the proposer) receives a sum of money and proposes a fair proposal (F - 5;5) or unfair proposal (U - 8;2). The second player (the responder) chooses to either accept (A) or reject (R) this proposal. If the second player accepts, the money is split according to the proposal. If the second player rejects, neither player receives any money. 1 A 5:5 2 F R 0:0 U A 8:2 2 1. Find the subgame perfect Nash Equilibrium using backward induction. R 0;0