Alice is using RSA digital signatures. When she signs 2 messages m₁ and m2 with signatures s(m₁) and s(m₂) and sends them to Bob, Eve intercepts all 4 pieces of this information. Eve now wants to forge the signatures for one of the following 3 messages (all considered as elements mod N, the public RSA modulus). One of them is easier than the others. Find it and show that Eve can forge it. 1. m = m1m2; 2. mm₁ + m2; 3. m 2 * M₁.

Alice is using RSA digital signatures. When she signs 2 messages m₁ and m2 with signatures s(m₁) and s(m₂) and sends them to Bob, Eve intercepts all 4 pieces of this information. Eve now wants to forge the signatures for one of the following 3 messages (all considered as elements mod N, the public RSA modulus). One of them is easier than the others. Find it and show that Eve can forge it. 1. m = m1m2; 2. mm₁ + m2; 3. m 2 * M₁.

Database System Concepts

7th Edition

ISBN:9780078022159

Author:Abraham Silberschatz Professor, Henry F. Korth, S. Sudarshan

Publisher:Abraham Silberschatz Professor, Henry F. Korth, S. Sudarshan

Chapter1: Introduction

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 1PE

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