alculate the value of the following infinitely repeated string of payoffs. 5 + 0.8*5 + 0.82*5 + 0.83*5 … 10 + 0.5*6 + 0.52*10 + 0.53*6 … For a strategy in an infinitely repeated game, a player will get 20 each round. They have a discount rate of 0.75.  What is their total utility for this strategy? For a strategy in an infinitely repeated game, a player will get 40 in the first round. After that, they alternate between getting 50 and getting 10.  e. in the second round they get 50, in the third they get 10, in the fourth they get 50, in the fifth they get 10 and so on.  They have a discount rate of 0.9.  What is their total utility for this strategy?

Determine all of the Nash equilibria (pure-strategy and mixed-strategy equilibria) of the following game:

aepioymentld=598281800483229979995799&elSBN=9780357133606&id%3D1061548135&snapshotld%32200166& 6. Using a payoff matrix to determine the equilibrium outcome Suppose there are only two firms that sell smartphones: Flashfone and Pictech. The following payoff matrix shows the profit (in millions of dollars) each company will earn, depending on whether it sets a high or low price for its phones. Pictech Pricing High Low High 11, 11 2, 15 Flashfone Pricing Low 15, 2 8, 8 For example, the lower-left cell shows that if Flashfone prices low and Pictech prices high, Flashfone will earn a profit of $15 million, and Pictech will earn a profit of $2 million. Assume this is a simultaneous game and that Flashfone and Pictech are both profit-maximizing firms. If Flashfone prices high, Pictech will make more profit if it chooses a price, and if Flashfone prices low, Pictech will make more profit if it chooses ▼ price. a If Pictech prices high, Flashfone will make more profit if it chooses a price, and…

Economics Consider an infinitely repeated game played between two firms with the following payoffs (firm 1 is listed first): ·         (250, 290) if both firms deviate ·         (290, 330) if both firms cooperate ·         (230, 370) if only firm 2 deviates ·         (350, 270) if only firm 1 deviates a. What probability-adjusted discount factor would ensure that Firm 1 would cooperate in a Nash equilibrium if Firm 2 applied a trigger strategy in the event that Firm 1 deviated?  b. What probability-adjusted discount factor would ensure that Firm 2 would cooperate in a Nash equilibrium if Firm 1 applied a trigger strategy in the event that Firm 2 deviated?