A Bargaining Game Two players, PI and PII, have to divide 23 M&M's: 12 regular ones (R's) and 11 peanut-coatedones (P's). PI likes both types equally but PII likes only the P's (she will have no use for anyR's she gets). Moreover, both players' preferences are known to both and the bargaining willbe restricted to the allocations of M&M's, e.g., no monetary side payments or othermodifications involved. (a) PI Divides and PII Chooses: PI divides the M&M's into two piles in any way hechooses. Then PII selects one of the piles, leaving the other one to PI. What will bethe outcome of this game? (b) PII Divides and PI Chooses: The same as in Problem 1, but with the order reversed.What will be the outcome?

Consider a repeated game with the following stage game: Player 1 O O O Cooperate Not Cooperate This game is repeated T-120 times, and t each period both players must choose their actions simultaneously. The players are deciding whether or not to cooperate specifically, whether or not to follow this cooperation strategy: r≤ 3 S|S|AW|N N|H "Each player will play cooperate as long as no one has played Not Cooperate before. If someone has played Not Cooperate before, then each player will play Not Cooperate forever." rs 5 rs Player 2 In this case, cooperation will be possible if the interest rate r is Not Cooperate 5,15 10, 10 None of the above Cooperate 12, 12 15,5

PLEASE HANDWRITE!!!

need a good explanation of this, Let G be an impartial game. Prove that G - G = 0 using only that for any game H, o(H) = P if and only if H = 0. important tips: read the instructions carefully and prove it is 0 by showing that second player is winner. o(G)=P iff G=0 use this statement to prove that G- G=0 that yoh can prove it zero by showing that second player is win

Consider the strategic voting game discussed at the endof this chapter, where we saw that the strategy profile (Bustamante, Schwarzenegger,Schwarzenegger) is a Nash equilibrium of the game. Show that (Bustamante, Schwarzeneg-ger, Schwarzenegger) is, in fact , the only rationalizable strategy profile. Do this by firstconsidering the dominated strategies of player L. (Basically, the question is asking youto find the outcome of the iterative elimination of strictly dominated strategies)

A Nash equilibrium occurs when O no player has an incentive to unilaterally change strategies. each player has an incentive to unilaterally change strategies. O both players can cooperate to increase their payoffs. O no player can earn a higher payoff from any other strategy.

Kayla and Kevin are friends who go together to a used textbook seller who has two copies ofthe biology book that they both need for their class this semester. The cost to the seller ofacquiring the books was $25 each and no other students will need this book. Kayla states thatshe is willing to pay $40 for the book, while Kevin says he is willing to pay $80. Which ofthe following describes the most likely conclusion to this scenario? Group of answer choices The seller will sell the books to both Kayla and Kevin for $40 each because if they tried tocharge Kevin a higher price, Kayla would engage in arbitrage. The seller will sell one book to Kayla for $40 and one book to Kevin for $80 because thismarket meets all three requirements for price discrimination. The seller will sell the books to both Kayla and Kevin for $80 each because Kevin's highervalue exceeds Kayla's willingness to pay. The seller will sell the books to both Kayla and Kevin for $25 each because that is howmuch the…

Two farmers Anil and Bala are each deciding how to deal with pest insects that destroy the crops they cultivate in their adjacent fields. They have the choice of using either Integrated Pest Control (IPC) or Terminator (T). The payoffs for their choices in terms of tonnes of crop are shown in the diagram. Which of the following statements is incorrect? 5 Bala's payoff لنا 2 1 O 0 Select one: • 1 T.T 2 3 Anil's payoff 4 T.I 5 LI-Both use Integrated Pest Control (IPC) T.T-Both use Terminator T, I-Anil uses Terminator, Bala uses IPC LT-Anil uses IPC Bala uses Terminator a. Pareto-efficiency does not necessarily mean that we should approve of it. b. (1, 1) Pareto-dominates (T, T). c. (1, 1) and (I, T) are Pareto-efficient. d. If Anil and Bala moving from (T, T) to (1, 1), there is Pareto-improvement as both farmers are better off. e. Pareto criterion tells us that (1, 1) is the best outcome as it is Pareto-efficient.

Consider a setting in which player 1 moves first by choosing among threeactions: a, b, and c. After observing the choice of player 1, player 2 choosesamong two actions: x and y. Consider the following three variants as towhat player 3 can do and what she knows when she moves:a. If player 1 chose a, then player 3 selects among two actions: high andlow. Player 3 knows player 2’s choice when she moves. Write down theextensive form of this setting. (You can ignore payoffs.)b. If player 1 chose a, then player 3 selects among two actions: high andlow. Player 3 does not know player 2’s choice when she moves. Writedown the extensive form of this setting. (You can ignore payoffs.)c. If player 1 chose either a or b, then player 3 selects among two actions: high and low. Player 3 observes the choice of player 2, but not that of player 1. Write down the extensive form of this setting.(You can ignore payoffs.)

Consider a modified Traveler’s Dilemma. In terms of strategy options that the players have and the dollars they earn, it is like the standard Traveler’s Dilemma, but the players do not have endless appetite for money. Up to 100 dollars, each dollar feels like a dollar. But any moneybeyond 100 is psychologically like 100 dollars. Assuming that players are maximizers of ‘psychological’ dollars instead of real dollars, describe all the Nash equilibria of this modified Traveler’s Dilemma.