92. 43. These three firms are the only firms in the market, so the sum of their outputs is equal to total market supply, i.e. q1+q2+q3=Q. Suppose demand is given by P=12-Q. For simplicity of calculation, suppose each firm has marginal costs of 0, i.e. c1(q1)=0, c2(q2)=0 and c3(q3)=0. (1) What quantity does Firm 1 produce in the SPNE of the game? (2) What quantity does Firm 2 produce in the SPNE of the game? (3) What quantity does Firm 3 produce in the SPNE of the game?

92. 43. These three firms are the only firms in the market, so the sum of their outputs is equal to total market supply, i.e. q1+q2+q3=Q. Suppose demand is given by P=12-Q. For simplicity of calculation, suppose each firm has marginal costs of 0, i.e. c1(q1)=0, c2(q2)=0 and c3(q3)=0. (1) What quantity does Firm 1 produce in the SPNE of the game? (2) What quantity does Firm 2 produce in the SPNE of the game? (3) What quantity does Firm 3 produce in the SPNE of the game?

ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

14th Edition

ISBN:9780190931919

Author:NEWNAN

Publisher:NEWNAN

Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 1QTC

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