7. The Phillie Phanatic always eats his ballpark franks in a special way- I foot-long hot dog together with precisely 1 bun, 1 oz. of mustard, and 2 oz. of pickle relish. His utility is a function only of these four items and any extra amounts of a single item without the other constituents is worthless. a. What form does PP's utility function for these four goods have? b. How might we simplify matters by considering PP's utility to be a function of only one good? What is that good? c. Suppose foot-long hot dogs cost $1, buns cost $.50, mustard costs $.05 per oz, and pickle relish costs $.1 5 per oz. How much does the good defined in part b cost? d. If the price of foot-long hot dog increases by 50 percent (to $1.50) what is the percentage increase in the price of the good? How would a 50% increase in the price of the bun affect the price of the good? Why is the answer different from part d? e. f. If the government wanted to raise $1 in taxes by taxing the goods that PP buys, how should it spread this tax over the four goods so as to minimize the utility cost to PP2

Please see below. I need help with this.

1. Sam is going to Baltimore for the day to watch his favorite baseball team (Orioles). Sam loves his Orioles, but he is addicted to drinking beer (B) and eating hotdogs (D) while watching his team. His utility function is: U = (B*D)1/2 a. Suppose Sam has $50 to spend on beer and hotdogs. Beer costs $5 a mug and a hotdog costs $4. Draw Sam's budget constraint. b. Suppose Sam spends all of his income on beer. How many mugs of beer can he buy? What is his utility? c. Will Sam's income allow him to reach a U = 5? d. If Sam buys 4 hotdogs, how many mugs of bear can he buy? What is his utility? e. What is the combination of beer and hotdogs that yield the highest utility? 2. Firm A's Price $20 $15 $20 $40 profit $35 profit Firm B's Price $37 profit $39 profit $15 $49 profit $38 profit $30 profit $35 profit a. Firms A and B are member of an oligopoly. Which solution will Firm A and B select? b. Is there a Nash equilibrium? If so, what is it? c. Which solution will Firm A and B select if Firm…

Consider a 2-good, 2-agent pure exchange economy where the initial endowment is eд = (5, 5), eß = (5, 5) and preferences are represented by UA, UB: R → R where UA (XA) UB (XB) = X₁X2 and Which 2 of the following 8 options are false: For all B [0, 1], the initial endowment is a Walrasian Equilibrium allocation. If B<1 then at prices p = (1,1) there will be excess demand of good 2 and excess supply of good 1. O For all B € [0, 1], every Pareto efficient allocation can be supported as a Walrasian Equilibrium for some reallocation of resources. O For any prices p = (1, 1), the budget sets of both players leave the Edgeworth box. For all B € [0, 1], the bottom left and top right corners of the Edgeworth box (0A and Og) are both Pareto efficient. For all B [0, 1], the Walrasian Equilibrium will be Pareto efficient. For all 8 [0, 1], Bob's preferences are strictly convex. For ß = 1/2, the Pareto Set is the straight line joining OA and Og.