ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
14th Edition
ISBN: 9780190931919
Author: NEWNAN
Publisher: Oxford University Press
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How do I solve for mixed-strategy equilibria?
Transcribed Image Text:3. The normal form payoff matrix for penalty kicks in soccer is given below. Solve for the
mixed strategy nash equilibrium for each player.
Goalie
Left
Right
Kicker
Left
.6,.4
.9,.1
Right
.9,.1
.5,.5
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