Non Reductive Physicalism
“‘And that’, he argued, ‘means that somewhere in them is intelligence.
It can’t be seated in a brain because dissection shows nothing like a brain
–but that doesn’t prove there isn’t something that does a brain’s job”
(Wyndham, 1951/2008, p. 47)
Suppose it is a nice sunny day, and you decide to linger in the sun; after a few minutes you may feel thirsty and you look for some refreshment. It can be said that this situation triggers two ‘situations’; on the one hand there is a physical process: the body’s reaction to heat, and on the other hand, there is a ‘mental effect’: the experience of heat like being thirsty. The relationship between the two situations has been the source of many debates within
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My own sympathies, supported by arguments like the completeness of physics (Papineau, 2001) –among others- and empirical research is with the physicalist approach. However, one of the problems with physicalism is its reductivism. For example, there is the claim that consciousness is no more than a brain process (Smart, 1959); however, the problem of these reductive approaches is to find the physical process or the physical laws that can explain the mental in those terms. There are strong arguments against such reduction: (Putnam, 1967, Davidson, 1970, Fodor, 1974) with the ideas of multiple realizability, special sciences and anomalous monism are all critical of reductive views, consequently a form of physicalism in non-reductive terms is not just plausible, but a promissory alternative of understanding the mental in physical terms; for instance, Baker (2008) suggests that “nonreductive materialism holds that the mental is ontologically part of the material world; yet, mental properties are causally efficacious without being reducible to physical properties” (Baker, 2009, p. 109).
It is argued in this thesis that physicalist ontology can be secure without the constraints and problems of reductionism, through this non-reductive physicalism (NRP for short). Moreover, if identity theory can be reconciled with a view such as functionalism then non-reductive physicalism can be argue it is a robust
In his writings, “A Contemporary Defense of Dualism,” J.P. Moreland argues the point that the mind and brain are separate from each other. It seems as a quick thought that both are the same. However, the mind deals with ideas, thoughts and hopes. The brain is made up of the neural process. Throughout the entire argument, Moreland tries to prove the theory of physicalism, which is the idea that only things that exist are composed of matter. His explanation is that the soul doesn’t exist and the brain controls everything.
In this paper, I will examine the principal merits and challenges of René Descartes’ concept of dualism and then defend my preferred alternative among the options Paul M. Churchland discusses. After briefly defining Cartesian Dualism, I will show that its principal merits are that it is consistent with common sense and that it is able to explain phenomena that appear mental in nature. Next, I will show that its principal challenges are its failure to adequately explain how the mind and the body can causally interact, and its failure to respond to the observation that brain damage impairs the mind. Finally, I will explain why Functionalism is the best alternative to Cartesian Dualism.
In my mind, dualism is a more attractive view to take when considering the mind-brain issue. The idea that the mind is a separate entity and that it is independent of the physical body is the central point of dualism. One reason it appeals to me is because of my religion, my Catholic upbringing. Introspection is another good reason why dualism is a little more logical to me than materialism.. It logically explains why the mind and brain are separate. Also, the divisibility argument raises good points to allow dualism to appear to be the more attractive idea in my eyes.
“Mary’s Room Thought Experiment” goes against the idea of Physicalism and I will explain why it is so by laying out reasons in my paper further explaining that Mary does learns something new when she escapes her black and white world for this first time and finally I will evaluate the intuition this thought experiment invokes by providing to a counterargument to my position. Physicalism is the belief that “all facts are physical facts”. Physical facts are facts about the world that we can learn in science text books. Such facts include, for example: Red light is about 650 nm.
The Knowledge Argument by Jackson is one of the main threats to Physicalism. Physicalism says that everything that is or could ever exist is ultimately physical in nature. The Knowledge Argument claims that there are truths about consciousness that cannot be deduced from the complete physical truth. Lewis’ response on the other hand, disagrees with the Knowledge Argument. In this paper I will address the Knowledge Argument and Lewis’ response to it.
There are two main theories that make up the knowledge argument. The first is Physicalism, (or better known as materialism) which is the thesis that “All facts are dependent upon physical processes.”(Smart) The other main stance taken is property dualism. The thesis of property dualism states that there are “Non-physical properties of physical substances” (Calef) or that there are physical and mental properties. In this article, I will defend the stance of property dualism by acknowledging objections and replying to these objections to show why the argument for property dualism works.
The mind-body problem is an age-old topic in philosophy that questions the relationship between the mental aspect of life, such as the field of beliefs, pains, and emotions, and the physical side of life which deals with matter, atoms, and neurons. There are four concepts that each argue their respective sides. For example, Physicalism is the belief that humans only have a physical brain along with other physical structures, whereas Idealism argues that everything is mind-based. Furthermore, Materialism argues that the whole universe is purely physical. However, the strongest case that answers the commonly asked questions such as “Does the mind exist?” and “Is the mind your brain?” is Dualism.
In this essay, I am going to write a response to the objection raised by the functionalists towards identity theory. Identity theory is a form of physicalism; it states that a particular mental state is identical to a particular physical state of body and brain, for instance mental sensation such as pain is simply just the firing of C-fibres (Smart, 1959). This is a reductionist view as it reduces our psychological state to a materialistic and physical form. A prominent objection against identity theory is Functionalism, in which the main advocate Hilary Putnam stated that identity theory is too narrow as it ignores multiple realisability. In the next paragraph, I will write a little more about functionalism, and in the end, I will ultimately conclude that functionalism is a better theory than identity theory.
The mind is perhaps the most fascinating part of the human body due to its complexity and ability to rationalize. In essence, the mind-body problem studies the relation of the mind to the body, and states that each human being seems to embody two unique and somewhat contradictory natures. Each human contains both a nature of matter and physicality, just like any other object that contains atoms in the universe. However, mankind also is constituted of something beyond materialism, which includes its ability to rationalize and be self-aware. This would imply that mankind is not simply another member of the world of matter because some of its most distinctive features cannot be accounted for in this manner. There are obvious differences between physical and mental properties. Physical properties are publically accessible, and have weight, texture, and are made of matter. Mental properties are not publically accessible, and have phenomenological texture and intentionality (Stewart, Blocker, Petrik, 2013). This is challenging to philosophers, because man cannot be categorized as a material or immaterial object, but rather a combination of both mind and body (Stewart, Blocker, Petrik, 2013). Man embodies mind-body dualism, meaning he is a blend of both mind and matter (Stewart, Blocker, Petrick, 2013). The mind-body problem creates conflict among philosophers, especially when analyzing physicalism in its defense. This paper outlines sound
In denying that the mind and mental properties, like qualia, are nonphysical things, mind-brain theory objects to both substance and property dualism. Therefore it is a physicalist approach to the philosophy of
A physicalist is one who believes that all information is physical. This is a view that sees all factual knowledge as that which can be formulated as a statement about physical objects and activities. Thus, the language of science can be reduced to third
Physicalism is a philosophical theory that attempts to solve the mind-body problem with its explanation of the results of the interactions between our brains and our bodies. Physicalism explains that everything in the universe is made up of
neurophysiological is to say the science of neurons dealing with living matter such as the
The physicalist that employs such strategy needs the phenomenal concepts to be essentially different from ordinary physical concepts, but nevertheless to co-refer to physical properties. One candidate to play the special role of phenomenal concepts vis-à-vis physical concepts is the so-called "experience thesis", that is, the thesis these concepts are experience-dependent: *one can only possess a phenomenal concept C if one undergoes the relevant experience about what the concept is about*. Besides the experience thesis, a second candidate to play the special feature in phenomenal concepts are their different *reference-fixing mechanisms*. Now we want to explore both of those features. I will begin by exploring the experience thesis, for it seems to be a general commitment shared by some of the phenomenal concept
Opposed to Mind-Body Materialism is Mind-Body Dualism, a view which supports that mind and body are not identical, but, in some sense, radically different kinds of thing. It denies that the mind is the same of the brain, or a product of the brain, by arguing that the thoughts and the material things are composed of different substances, and the mind is a thinking thing that lacks the usual attributes of physical objects: size, shape, location, solidity, motion, etc. According to the Dualism, the soul is comprised of a non-physical substance, while the body is constituted of matter. This view also establishes that mind and body are capable of causally affecting each other, even if they are necessarily not the same thing. When applying this notion the human body, the meaning becomes clearest: the intellect is responsible for all our acts, but it does not imply that the intellect is the brain. For example, before eating a meal, which is a physical action, you probably felt hungry,