Why Functionalism Is A Better Theory Than Identity Theory

Introduction: In the talk on Wednesday March 2, Dr. Hannah Tiemey gave a presentation on the subject of personal identity. The title is “Subscript Pluralism: A Distinct View of Distinct Selves”. The two topics were biological continuity and psychological continuity and how a person is both. I agree with Tiemey’s point that a person can be both psychological and biological.

In Harman’s paper, “The Intrinsic Quality of Experience,” he defends the concept of functionalism, which is the theory that mental states are identified by what they do as opposed to what they are made of. Harman defends functionalism by stating the three familiar arguments against functionalism and then refutes those arguments. Out of the three oppositions to functionalism, the inverted spectrum argument is the best.

In the world of philosophy, there has been an ever growing skepticism of the relationship between the human body and its mental state. The physical state of a person is tangible, meaning that they can be seen by anyone and touched. While the mental state of a person is embedded in their consciencousness, meaning that it can’t be observed by others unless willing expressed by said person. I will be using Leibniz’s law of identity to show that the metal states of an individual are distinct from a physical state. Using the notion of sameness, I can prove a valid argument that the physical and mental states are distinct. While this theory in part can be debated, some identity theorists can provide a rebuttal this claim. I will provide a response to an identity theorist rebuttal.

Before we can explore the degree to which Aristotle’s philosophy aligns with that of modern functionalists, we must first account for the philosophy of modern functionalism. Principally, functionalists believe that mental states (e.g., beliefs, desires, feeling pain) are solely constituted by their function. This is their solution to the “mind/body problem”. Cartesian dualists claimed that a special mental substance (distinct from the body) is where the ultimate nature of the mental resides. Physicalists ( descendants of the materialists) equate mental states with brain states. On the other hand, functionalists assert that the mental states causal relations to one and other and to sensory inputs and behavioral outputs constitute these mental states. Some functionalists, often called computational functionalists, go as far as to say that these internal states operate in the same way as a computer program. Furthermore, this line of thought leads directly to the “transportability thesis”, which hypothesizes that a human mind could be transported into an electronic computer,

Ned Block, in his article “Trouble with Functionalism”, creates a thought experiment to serves as a counterexample to functionalism. Functionalism states that the mind and its mental states are only comprised of the functional role they serve, and not of the physical medium it occurs in. Block’s thought experiment, while intriguing, is ultimately a flawed comparison that wrongly applies human-centric prejudice to the definition of a mental state, and thus, cannot be applied to our mental life.

In the 1960’s, Hilary Putnam introduced the world of philosophy to the multiple realizability argument against identity theory. Her main point in her argument was that, if identity theory holds to be true, than all living creatures who experience pain, such as humans, mammals, reptiles, etc., must have a commonly shared physical-chemical brain state which directly relates to a certain mental

Paul Churchland gives many arguments supporting the identity theory. In the, Introduction to Philosophy by Louis P. Pojman, we are informed that the, “identity theory claims that mental states are physical states of the brain”(315). This means that “each type of mental state.. is the very same thing with some type of physical state or process in the brain or central nervous system”(315). Churchland provides four reasons in support of “human-behavior-and-its-causes must be in physical neurosciences”(316). His arguments include the physical development of a person, history of evolution, neural dependence of all known mental phenomena, and the growing success of neurosciences.

The mind is a complex myriad of thoughts and psychological systems that even philosophers today cannot entirely grapple. It is composed of the senses, feelings, perceptions, and a whole series of other components. However, the mind is often believed to be similar or even the same as the brain. This gives rise to the mind-brain identity theory, and whether there exists a clear distinction between the physical world and the non-material mind. In this paper, I will delineate the similarities and differences between mind and brain, describe the relevant ideas such as functionalism and materialism, and provide explanations on how these theories crystallized. Further, I will discuss the differing views of this concept from multiple philosophers’ perspectives and highlight the significance of each. Ultimately, I will defend the view that the mind-brain identity theory is false by analyzing its errors and examining the invalid assumptions it makes about consciousness.

The following essay explores varying theories associates with having mental states. According to a Philosophy professor at Simon Fraser University, Dr. Mac, mental states are beliefs or desires or more precisely, states of mind. In this essay, we examine behaviourism and type identity theory, the views held by doctor one and two respectively. In accordance to me, doctor one’s ideology is more acceptable because behaviourism not only provides a solution to the dualism problem but also provides a clear meaning as to what mental states are and the role they play in our day to day lives. The argument is supported by the fact that behaviourism is a scientifically accepted theory, it allows for psychologists to carry out their research and it

In this paper, I will argue that the Memory Theory of Personal Identity is the closest to the truth. I will do so by showing that the opposing theories – Body and Soul Theories – have evident flaws and that the

unexplainable being that he called the mind. Sober sums up, that the Identity Theory is a

Functionalism is the dogma for creating something a thought; a desire, a belief, pain, or satisfaction by allowing its dependence only on the role it plays in the cognitive system. Another classic example demonstrated through the functionalist theory, is being in a mental state of pain that induces the notion that something is wrong with one’s body, where the individual wishes to be out of its mental state and as a result, possible behavioral outputs may include wincing, moaning, crying, or anxiety. In the functionalist theory, it states that any creature that is capable of a mental state and meets its conditions experiences pain (Levin). Humans have a process of neural activity, for instance C-fiber stimulation, which meets the conditions of functionalism. Therefore, humans can experience pain by C-fiber stimulation. The theory also allows other creatures with different physical makeups that have mental states can also experience pain. Functionalist became aware that creatures with different types of physical states could experience pain.

I think my value reflects the theory I have indicated in from my previous blog response because in the discussions, “Functionalists examine how sports contributes to the development of individuals, believing that sport teaches youth basic values and desirable characters such as team work, discipline, hard work, accepting authority, which help us get along in society, in the world.” (Buchanan 2017). In relation to the response, if it is something that I am passionate about, then I would continuously work with it to become a better productive person. For instance, I have failed many volley ball games but I accepted it by increasing effort to get the good results wanted, having the team look down on me, dependently.

The development of the Identity Theory of Mind is representative of materialist philosophy’s shift towards questions of human consciousness. Within philosophical and scientific circles, discussions of the mind and body have supplanted discussions of what constitutes the world around us. Staggering technological innovation, alongside the establishment of superior of scientific research methodologies, has given rise to this philosophical trend – Identity Theory is, indeed, the culmination of this trend. Throughout the course of this essay I will both define and defend Identity Theory against what I consider to be two superficially convincing counter-arguments; namely, the invocation of the ‘Leibniz Law’ (otherwise referred to as The Identity of Indiscernibles) and ‘The Problem of Other Minds’. Though seemingly persuasive, the invocation of the Leibniz Law, at its core, consists of a semantic trick. As a general ontological principle the Leibniz Law may possess some validity; in its specific application to Identity Theory however, it remains destitute of substance. On the other hand, The Problem of Other Minds relies on a radical scepticism irreconcilable with current understandings of the brain. Based on the degree of scientific knowledge available regarding the composition of the brain, Identity Theory, at this time, provides a logical and coherent account of the relationship between mind and body.

Putnam argued that “the psychological properties are functional, not physical” (Putnam, 1967, p81), this is, according to Putnam, those functional properties must be “abstract properties” (Putnam, 1967, p.299) , nonetheless, Putnam claimed that depends upon physical and chemical properties of the brain, therefore, by applying the completeness of physics, those functional properties must be physical, and this physical view of functional states is defended by Lewis: “these causal roles which belong by analytic necessity to experiences belong in fact to certain physical states. Since those physical states possess the definitive characteristic of experience, they must be the experiences.” (Lewis, 1970, p. 17), however, this lead to the question, how identify a functional state with a brain state, avoiding the constraints of the identity theory? A plausible answer is tried to identify a functional state with a brain state via multiple realizability, but contrary to Putnam, keeping functional states as physical states; for instance Lewis give us a point of departure: