Summary: Joint Logistic Course

In early January 2002, American intelligence received evidence of a large volume of enemy forces assembling in the Shahi Kot Valley in Eastern Afghanistan. Central Command (CENTCOM), led by General Tommy R. Franks, was directing combat operations in Afghanistan through the Coalition Forces Land Component Command (CFLCC) and Coalition Forces Air Component Command (CFACC). As the interest in assaulting the Shahi Kot Valley amplified, General Franks reached a conclusion that a U.S. tactical commander was a need in Afghanistan. The decision was to assign the 10th Mountain Division Commander, Major General (MG) Franklin Hagenbeck, as the tactical commander. In an effort to strengthen MG Hagenbeck’s command authority, CENTCOM named his headquarters Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) Mountain and gave it command and control authority over Operation Anaconda. By having command and control authority, MG Hagenbeck would encounter challenges with the command structure. The challenges of command structure were due to CJTF Mountain not having tactical control (TACON) of multiple Special Operation Forces, the Joint Special Operations Air Component (JSOAC), and friendly Afghanistan forces. These misunderstandings were resolved during the execution phase, but rectifying the command relationships prior would have avoided lost time and resources needed on enemy forces and positions. In this paper, I will identify the challenges of command structure during Operation Anaconda.

On January 12, 2010 on of the world’s deadliest earthquakes struck Haiti. In his book, Humanitarian Aftershocks in Haiti, Mark Schuller analyzes the presence of humanitarian aid agencies following the disaster. He discusses the impacts the aid had on the environment, development and globalization of Haiti.

A key segment that I had an opportunity to investigate was the JFO role in disaster relief. The Joint Field Office, is a Federal multiagency coordination center established locally to facilitate field level domestic incident management activities related to response and recovery in the event of an incident. It serves a centralized location for coordination of Federal, state, local, tribal, nongovernmental and private-sector organizations. Organized into four sections: Operations,

Whether she knew it or not, Mother Theresa was talking about the Joint Planning Process. She best describes this process as teamwork. The use of teamwork, or the Joint Planning Process, by leaders of the Armed Forces during Operation Anaconda allowed for planning considerations critical to the success of the operation. This paper will explain the seven steps of the Joint Planning Process, and how these steps or the lack of these steps will dictate mission success or failure as seen in Operation Anaconda.

The Joint Force Commander (JFC) utilizes command and control to exercise authority over assigned and attached forces within his or her command. Command provides direction and motivation to individuals and units, whereas control is the task of managing forces and the associated tasks required to accomplish the mission. Effective command and control successfully balances the art of command with the science of control and strengthens the commander’s ability to make and execute decisions. Mission command advances command and control

The US Central Command’s planning for Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) was not the all-inclusive plan that joint operations require. Joint operations are no longer limited to major combat operations, but encompass a wide range of actions. Planning for joint operations requires input from many sources to produce a successful campaign plan to meet the desired end state. Operational design provides a concept and a construction framework that underpins a campaign and its execution. (JP GL13). Evaluating the planning process by using the operational design identifies some of CENTCOM’s shortfalls. US military planners’ lack of understanding of the operational environment led to an inadequately defined problem that resulted in a faulty operational approach. CENTCOM’s approach did not have the right assessment to gauge the effectiveness of the plan such as alerting planners when and if the plan needed modification. Current joint planning policy incorporates several of CENTCOM’s shortfalls in an attempt to provide a better planning process for future joint operations.

Due to the sensitivity of the mission, the Department of Defense chose to bypass already established Joint Task Forces (JTF) that existed. Instead, an ad-hoc JTF was created specifically for Operation Eagle Claw. The newly created JTF encountered problems defining areas of responsibility and areas of focus. The JTF included three branches of the military in the operation the Navy, Army, and Air Force. The operation rehearsed for five months prior to its execution. The JTF never conducted a rehearsal during the five months. All elements conducted individual rehearsals only joining on the night of execution. Problems that were encountered on the night of Operation Eagle Claw were never identified prior which ultimately contributed to the failure of the mission.

Joint Task Force Katrina: This command center was expected to represent the active involvement of the Department of Defense (DoD).

Principles of Mission Command in Operation Anaconda SSG Jaboris Pittman SLC 25W 502-18 Abstract I will discuss my analytical view on the events that took place in 2002, titled “Operation Anaconda”. Richard Kulger wrote the case study that gives in depth insight on these events. Several units participated in this mission from Special Operations (SOF), 10th Mountain, U.S. Army Rangers, and also units from Afghanistan Army.

While analyzing the North Africa conflict, a combination of service capabilities would be required to achieve the desired end state of deterring and if necessary, the defeat of Algerian guerilla aggression to prevent regional and global destabilization. Taking into account the current military landscape that exists today, a joint task force (JTF) would be the ideal military response of the United States and collation partner’s while utilizing the regional military assets. Intelligence suggests guerilla forces are capable of a full scale offensive into Morocco in less than 36 hour notice, bringing the factors of time, force and space into consideration.

Due to the location of Haiti and the nature of United States Southern Command’s (USSOUTHCOM) mission; support interagency efforts that promote regional security cooperation, they lead the Department of Defense’s (DOD) efforts of providing assistance and standing up Joint Task Force Haiti (JTF-H). Ultimately, USSOUTHCOM’s execution of Operation Unified Response resulted in immeasurable successes however; it did not come without challenges.

To improve after a natural disaster such as an earthquake, recovery takes a lot out of the government, the people, and the allied countries. When an unexpected major earthquake hit Haiti, a country in the Caribbean, in 2010, at least 200,000 to 316,000 deaths occurred. The many deaths, displaced people, and destroyed buildings left Haiti in ruins. The government and the people were filled with dreadful sorrows as these truths about a ruined Haiti came to light. Immediately after this disaster, allied countries such as the United States and Canada stepped in to pay for search parties and repairing Haiti, physically and emotionally. Even with the support of allied countries and the government, the development of Haiti is still in need of assistance. Six years later, after the 7.0 magnitude earthquake hit Haiti, the handouts and help from allied countries have not been enough to create a fully developed economy and efficient government.

The United States Military continues to prepare sailors and soldiers for a range of military operations. While the military is largely known for fighting and winning the nation’s wars, it is not uncommon for military commanders to face challenges outside that of military combat operations. One of the more challenging operations that Joint Force Commanders face, is that of responding to natural disasters.

The first step when establishing a JTF is how to organize the assigned or attached forces to accomplish the mission.1 JTF-PANTHEON in response to the crisis must evaluate the capabilities and limitations of current forces as well as formulate a request for forces (RFF) if needed.

Stationed at Hunter Army Airfield, GA., The medevac was task to assist with disaster recovery when South Carolina was affected by catastrophic, life-threatening flooding. The Commanders, from the company level all the way up to Brigade, using operational sustainment, and knowing what the organization was capable of, were able to organize crews and make the decision to go. This required crews that were trained and proficient at the tasks such as hoist and over-water operations. The equipment necessary to do rescue operations, from the medical equipment up to having aircrafts available. This also meant sustainment in the form of organizational support from DART teams and operations personnel, all ready and providing help in the rear. We were able to accomplish what was asked of us because of training and leadership support at all levels. Sustainment relies on every individual within the organization to do their part, and leadership to be able to recognize deficiencies and have a plan to address this. All in an effort to become fully functional in their warfighting skills and mission