Space Shuttle Challenger Research Paper

On January 28, 1986, the Space Shuttle Challenger “violently exploded” tragically after 73 seconds of flight (Reagan). Ronald Reagan then came out to remind everyone of the importance of mistakes like this and not to let them destroy people's confidence. He stated, “It’s all part of the process of exploration and discovery. It’s all part of taking a chance and expanding man's horizons. The future doesn’t belong to the fainthearted; it belongs to the brave.

At first NASA demonstrated a lack of ethnics by trying to cover up the story by calling the challenger disaster an strange accident, but eventually people started to come forward, like Richard cook, and the public finally found out the truth that the real reason behind the disaster was a combination of poor management and bad temperature conditions. The space shuttle used rubber o rings as a seal between the different rocket booster sections. The people who built the boosters, Morton- Thiokol, built the o rings in certain way to be only used when the temperatures are above freezing; however, the challenger was launched after a very cold night. The cold temperature caused the o rings to become very stiff, fragile and unable to properly seal well. In response to the fragile o rings hot gas from the booster was able to escape.

Unfortunately, neither of those two goals were achieved because Challenger had a catastrophic failure just 73 seconds into flight. At the memorial service at Johnson Space Center President Reagan is quoted as saying “Sometimes, when we reach for the stars, we fall short. But we must pick ourselves up again and press on despite the pain.” Upon investigation by the Rogers Commission, a team of scientists and engineers, found the O-ring that seated the field joints together on the solid rocket boosters was what had caused the catastrophic failure of shuttle orbiter Challenger.

The Challenger disaster was not only a disaster in terms of the destruction of the spacecraft and the death of its crew but also in terms of the decision-making process that led to the launch and in terms of the subsequent investigation into the "causes" of the disaster. The decision to recommend for launch was made by lower-level management officials over the objections of technical experts who opposed the launch under the environmental conditions that existed on the launch pad at the time. Furthermore, the lower-level managers who made this decision--both NASA and contractor personnel--chose not to report the objections of the technical experts in their recommendations to higher levels in the management chain- of-command to

It was the Columbia’s 28th mission, which was originally scheduled to launch two years ago, on 11th of January, 2001, but was delayed 13 times due to different missions took priority in the two years period. On 16th January at 1210 a.m., a problem with the external tank attachment ring had discovered. Due to this fault, the ring plate might not meet the safety factor requirement of 1.4, ‘that is, able to withstand 1.4 times the maximum load expected in operation.’(CAIB 2003 p.33). Then, based on Columbia space shuttle had delayed for too long, the safety factor requirement was waived. The active manager of the launch team then gave a GO signal to the space shuttle. At 57 seconds after launched, Columbia received a wind shear which increased the aerodynamic force on the external tank. It might be one of the reasons that leads to the

These consequences can lead to monumental fiascoes. One such fiasco took place in the mining town of Pitcher, Oklahoma in 1950. A mining engineer warned the miners that their town could cave in at any moment from excessive excavating. He suggested immediate evacuation of the town. The leading citizens of the town held a meeting and mocked the engineers’ warning. A few days later, the disaster hit, taking the lives of those who refused to leave. They followed the poor decision made by the leading citizens of the town. All seven symptoms were present in the 1950 mining disaster. A second example of groupthink would be the events surrounding the space shuttle Challenger, the product of flawed decisions. The evidence was inadvisable to launch the space shuttle at the earliest opportunity. NASA’s perspective was that is was undesirable to delay the launch because of the impact it would have on political and public support for the program. Authorities dismissed potentially lethal hazards as only acceptable risks because of NASA’s engineer’s pressure to launch. The decision to launch the shuttle amounted to a much greater loss than the loss of political and public support. A third example of groupthink involves the group around Admiral HE Kimmel, which failed to prepare for the possibility of a Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor despite repeated warnings. Informed by his intelligence chief that radio contact with Japanese aircraft carriers

Ronald Reagan commissioned a panel known as the Warren Commission to investigate the disaster. The commission concluded that the cause of failure was an O-ring on the solid rocket booster that failed to seal properly because of cold temperatures. Engineers at NASA had warned their superiors that they

Instead, they maintained their current trajectory of making decisions qualitatively. NASA should have improved their risk management processes as more data was gathered. Databases could have been compiled with the information from previous flights that could have provided probabilistic risk assessment and trends for future flights. If NASA and Thiokol had used quantitative data when assessing the erosion and blow by incidents, they likely would have come to a different conclusion when they decided to launch the Challenger shuttle.

The initial threat to the ability of NASA to sustain the dramatic changes in the wake of the Challenger disaster started well before the lives of the astronauts were lost. The lack of centralization of management and the fact that different aspects of the organization had locations ranging from D.C. to Florida allowed for no one to really accept and own up to the fact that they were at fault. No one group or person took responsibility, so it was cast upon the entire NASA organization and no one took it upon themselves to make sure that a disaster of this caliber would ever happen again.

The Challenger Space program was one of the most delayed missions in the history of United States government’s space programs. In order to prevent the disastrous decision making process caused by Groupthink the administration involved in managing the Challenger space program should have encouraged those involved to speak freely on the subject without repercussions, had a separate entity determine the final decision on whether or not to launch, and invited outside experts to determine the authenticity of concerns. Many of those who were under contract with NASA felt pressured to refrain from objecting due to prior setbacks in design and construction. The managers of NASA should have remained neutral in their stance to the launch even though

The significant engineering failure that will be analyze is the Space Shuttle Challenger. In 1986, the Challenger faced many launch delays. The first delay of the Challenger was due to the expected weather front and presence of the Vice President (ENGINEERING.com). Since rain and cold temperatures were expected to move into the area, they didn’t want the Vice President to make unnecessary trips. However, the launch window became perfect weather conditions since the weather front stalled. The second delay was due to a defective microswitch in the hatch locking mechanism. By the time the problem was fixed, the winds became too high and the weather front had started to move again.

The challenger disaster that took place in January 28 has led to the explosion of the shuttle itself and the death of all the crew members including the chosen teacher. A real disaster that occurred due to some wrong decisions and overriding some important information from professional employees within the company is considered a real catastrophe. Applying pressure on senior management team of the company that has developed the rocket in order to change their opinion about launching can be considered to be another catastrophe. All these misjudgment actions from the NASA team and the Morton Thiokol team have lead to the challenger real crisis.

The failure of the O-Rings during Challenger’s launch ultimately resulted from the varying shortcomings made in the decision process which allowed the risk to be present. Groupthink played an influential role in dominating the process and naturally pushed the risk to the wayside. In the wake of the Challenger incident, many lessons regarding professional and decisional bias have been examined and regrettably noted as being very preventable through the use of more careful examination. While the errors made in the decisional process throughout the tenure of the project were made by many individuals, it is important to note that the subtle behaviors exhibited are all naturally occurring phenomenon within individuals. In the light of tragedy, it is very easy to blame the shortcomings of individuals to instill comfort within ourselves and to dismiss the actions of others as being completely ignorant. However, human behavior is the foundation of the decision making process and therefore carries with it imperfection. When minor effects are left unguarded and then coupled with a variety of pressuring restraints it becomes more reasonable to see why mistakes are made and why accidents

On February 1st, 2003 seven Americans lost their lives while returning to earth after finishing a mission for mankind. These Americans were aboard the space shuttle Challenger that broke apart during reentry into the earth’s atmosphere and was completely destroyed. After an extensive investigation the cause of the accident was determined to be the result of a hole that was punctured into the leading edge of the aircraft during takeoff (NASA). This hole resulted in an excess heating on the leading edge of the wing and then the failure of the wing. This was just the physical cause of the accident that destroyed the shuttle. There were other aspects

The challenger disaster that took place in January 28 has led to the explosion of the shuttle itself and the death of all the crew members including the chosen teacher. A real disaster that occurred due to some wrong decisions and overriding some important information from professional employees within the company is considered a real catastrophe. Applying pressure on senior management team of the company that has developed the rocket in order to change their opinion about launching can be considered to be another catastrophe. All these misjudgment actions from the NASA team and the Morton Thiokol team have lead to the challenger real crisis.