Kodak And The Eastman Kodak Company

Kathy Hudson was appointed to the newly created CIS unit in 1988 by CEO Colby Chandler with a directive to “overhaul the existing IT organization to promote the use of IT to improve the competive position of Kodak businesses while lowering cost.” At the time of her appointment, Kodak was suffering several serious business setbacks, along with rising competition and a Polaroid lawsuit. Jobs were cut and reorganization attempts did little to alleviate falling profits. Kodak needed an IT overhaul

The problem in this case is concerned with Eastman Kodak losing its market share in film products to lower-priced economy brands. Over the last five years, in addition to being brand-aware, customers have also become price-conscious. This has resulted in the fast paced growth of lower priced segments in which Kodak has no presence.

It is considered that photography only became widely available to the public when the Kodak Eastman Company introduced the box shaped Brownie Camera in 1900. (Baker, n.p.) Its features became more refined since its original placing on the market; one of the reasons why it has become considered the birth of public photography is because of the processing. Using a similar image capture system, the brownie exposed the light to a 120mm roll of film, which could be wound round, meaning six photographs could be taken before the slides needed removing. The first Brownie used a six-exposure cartridge that Kodak processed for the photographer. (Kodak.com, n.d.) Realistically, the armature photographers did not need to understand darkroom processes,

The problem in this case is Kodak's steadily eroding market share and shareholder value in the film rolls market. This is especially undesirable given the fact that the market has been growing at a tepid 2% annual rate and the steadily increasing threat from competition. Kodak needs to come up with a strategy for corrective action so as to arrest this decline, regain market share and increase share holder value. Kodak's strategy is to reposition itself by targeting a new segment of price sensitive customers and re-segmenting the super premium customers’ space by including a wider segment of special occasion customers.

When Kodak began making changes to its organizational architecture in 1984, its current architecture did not fit the business environment for the industry. The largest factor that motivated Kodak to make this change was increased competition and decreased market share. Until the early 1980’s, Kodak owned the film production market with very little competition. This suddenly changed when Fuji Corporation and many other generic store brands began producing high quality film as well (Brickley, 2009, p. 358). Another factor in this change was technology advancements. As technology rapidly expanded in the 1980’s, other

Polaroid’s overall growth strategy was to be the number one and only instant photography company through the invention of it’s own technology in its own laboratories. “Growth objectives are a key part of an organization’s overall strategic plan. Almost all strategic plans deal with the size the company wishes to be in the future” (Human Resource Management pg. 110). One of the ways in which Polaroid planned to be the only instant photography company—in turn would also make it the greatest—was through 533 patents. “Polaroid is still characterized by many as a company that hold too tight a grip on its patents” (Human Resource Management pg. 130). Polaroid’s strategic plan was always to stick with their one invention, improve on it’s technology, and target the sole market. This affected HR planning and strategy because Edwin H. Land did not want to enter other markets; Land wanted Polaroid to be about instant photography. The decision to stay in only one market affected HR from doing what they are suppose to do. It prevented them from being creative or innovative.

Taking pictures with the Kodak camera was simpler than the earlier camera because first, it did not require a darkroom or chemicals and glass plates. It did not require any of these things because it was not only one person’s job to develop and take the photo. The photographer could send their camera in, and the Eastman Kodak Company would develop the pictures for them. “In the first year, 13,000 people paid $25 for a Kodak; they each took 100 pictures, returned the camera and within ten days, Kodak sent back the prints and camera with film for another 100 pictures,” (Buckland and Lefer 250). This opened up a whole new door for inexperienced photographers. All they had to do was take pictures, and send the camera

In my March 6 memo, I discussed the need for Kodak to revamp its core strategy and regain popularity. Eastman Kodak has been the leader of photography and printing products for nearly 130 years. Over the last few years Kodak has been in distress due to its poor fundamental shift into the digital age. Lack of strategic creativity led Kodak to misunderstand the industry in which it was operating. This lack of strategic creativity was costly for Kodak.

To account for their miscalculation in film sales, Kodak is undergoing a massive digitally based shift. Kodak plans on building a stronger base in its consumer, medical, and profession imaging products. However, this shift does not come without a price tag. Kodak’s projected spending could reach as much as $3 billion in future investments to aid the shift. With these investments Kodak claims a tremendous turnaround in revenue. Kodak anticipates reaching $16 billion in revenue by 2006 and $20 billion by 2010. To pay

Question 6: It was reported that Kodak filed for bankruptcy protection on January 2012. Please provide your comments on the failure of Kodak. If you were CEO of this company, what would you transform and reorganize in the company

Background Eastman Kodak Company, headquartered in Rochester New York, was founded in 1889. The corporation, now multinational and focusing on imaging and photographic equipment, posted revenues in excess of $6 billion in 2011. During most of the 20th century Kodak was dominant in the photographic film industry in 1976 it held 90% of the market but began a downward slide once the Internet, digital cameras and computer processing grew. By 2007, Kodak ceased making a profit and in January 2012 filed for bankruptcy protection and ceased making cameras, video cameras and began to focus on the corporate digital imaging market (De La Merced, 2012). In evaluating Kodak's corporate strategy from the mid-1980s onward, we find that there four major management paradigms in place during this transitional period:

It was Kodak’s’ strategy to sell the cameras at low prices, and it used to earn revenue from the films; this strategy is called the razor-blade strategy. This model for photography became flop when Sony introduced a camera with floppy disk inside, in which there wasn’t any use of films. As a result of Sony’s introduction of the Mavica in 1981, Kodak took it as a threat and started investing in the digital photography. For this purpose, it has conducted a huge research on the digital photography. As exposed by Fisher in 1997, Kodak’s respond wasn’t appropriate for the digital world: “One of the mistakes we [Kodak] have made is that we [Kodak]’ve tried to do it all. We [Kodak] do not have to pursue all aspects of the digital opportunity and service side.”

While Kodak continued its overwhelming domination of the photo film market, its market share in the United States had eased from about 76% to 70% over the past five years “as competitors like Fuji Photo Film Co. and Konica Corp. wooed consumers with lower-priced

The primary focus of Foto Inc. (“Foto”) has always been to develop a winning competitive strategy. Foto’s strategy focused on growing the market share and capitalizing on the growing consumer interest in digital cameras. Such an effective strategy kept the company in the ranks of the industry leaders and allowed Foto to have consistent positive Times-Interest-Earned for each quarter, a positive ROE, a positive EPS, as well as maintain a Class B or better Credit rating. Foto, Inc. has an outstanding image indicator as well. On the contrary, the company had the poorest market share in North America at one point when compared to competitors, and has consistently struggled with market share in Latin America.

The Norris Company is a large printing company that focus in quality color work with three quality printing plants. Chet Craig, who is the manager of the Norris Company’s central plant, has a huge issue with depression and anxiety recently. Chet thinks he didn’t accomplish anything during day work, and he owns his family and local community too much. Chet has an ambition project that called “open-end unit scheduling” to help the company, but because of the unreasonable staff structure makes him too busy; he cannot take a time to think about his project. Therefore, he needs to figure out the solution to solve this