Evaluating Kodak's Corporate Strategy

With attention to the previous information given, the principle of risk-return tradeoff is based on the thought that individuals are opposed to taking risk, meaning individuals would prefer to get a certain return on their investment rather than risking and getting an uncertain return. (Titman, Keown, & Martin, 2014) This principle tells us that investors will receive higher returns for taking on a bigger risk however; a challenge often seen in investors is how to calculate the tradeoff between risks and return with riskier investments. A higher expected rate of return is not always a higher actual return.

Fujifilm got its start with the production of motion picture film, dry plates and photographic paper. It was difficult for Fujifilm initially to develop brand recognition due to the market prevalence of the Eastman Kodak Company.   Fujifilm’s quality standards were not on par with Kodak and this created a challenge to gaining any traction. Fujifilm’s plan to compete was to develop film and paper that were compatible with the processing systems used mostly worldwide.   By 1969, all of their films, photo paper and chemicals completely matched these processing systems.   With the concentration on the quality of its products, Fujifilm was able to develop its first film product and a motion-picture negative film which proved to consumers in Japan that Fujifilm was technically proficient and resulted in a demand for their products.

Though Kodak had flaws with decision making by its senior management, they have acted upon not making hierarchical structure as their organization’s framework. Another article called “Lessons from the past by Jessica Lipnack and Jeffrey Stamps on “Turning Hierarchy on its Side” explains the famous “Pizza” organization of Eastman Kodak. This structure encourages that company to communicate horizontally and not vertically. There is no up or down chain of command, instead it is a cross-sectional approach. Though it maintains hierarchy, the CEO’s role is more central in the structure rather than

The problem in this case is concerned with Eastman Kodak losing its market share in film products to lower-priced economy brands. Over the last five years, in addition to being brand-aware, customers have also become price-conscious. This has resulted in the fast paced growth of lower priced segments in which Kodak has no presence.

It is considered that photography only became widely available to the public when the Kodak Eastman Company introduced the box shaped Brownie Camera in 1900. (Baker, n.p.) Its features became more refined since its original placing on the market; one of the reasons why it has become considered the birth of public photography is because of the processing. Using a similar image capture system, the brownie exposed the light to a 120mm roll of film, which could be wound round, meaning six photographs could be taken before the slides needed removing. The first Brownie used a six-exposure cartridge that Kodak processed for the photographer. (Kodak.com, n.d.) Realistically, the armature photographers did not need to understand darkroom processes,

The problem in this case is Kodak's steadily eroding market share and shareholder value in the film rolls market. This is especially undesirable given the fact that the market has been growing at a tepid 2% annual rate and the steadily increasing threat from competition. Kodak needs to come up with a strategy for corrective action so as to arrest this decline, regain market share and increase share holder value. Kodak's strategy is to reposition itself by targeting a new segment of price sensitive customers and re-segmenting the super premium customers’ space by including a wider segment of special occasion customers.

When Kodak began making changes to its organizational architecture in 1984, its current architecture did not fit the business environment for the industry. The largest factor that motivated Kodak to make this change was increased competition and decreased market share. Until the early 1980’s, Kodak owned the film production market with very little competition. This suddenly changed when Fuji Corporation and many other generic store brands began producing high quality film as well (Brickley, 2009, p. 358). Another factor in this change was technology advancements. As technology rapidly expanded in the 1980’s, other

In late March 1996, Ralph Norwood was faced with the task of restructuring Polaroid’s capital structure. In the past, Polaroid had a monopoly in the instant-photography segment. However, with upcoming threats in the emerging digital photography industry and Polaroid experiencing recent losses in their market share due to Kodak’s competition, Gary T. DiCamillo, recently appointed CEO of Polaroid, headed a restructuring plan to stimulate the firm’s performance. The firm’s new plan has goals such as to aggressively exploit the existing Polaroid brand, introduce product extensions, and enter new emerging markets such as Russia in order to secure Polaroid’s future.

Kodak and Polaroid are both extremely different firms. Polaroid has only one specialization and that is the instant photo market. Kodak on the other hand has reaches in all photo related industries. Kodak had high fixed costs due to their in-house production while Polaroid opted to be flexible and loose by subcontracting most of its production facilities. Therefore, Kodak had to reach a certain level of market volume in order to break even and become profitable. Polaroid, on the other hand, had huge R&D cost that was an impediment to break-even point. This difference in strategy was an incentive that gave Kodak its reasoning for aggressive maneuvers in the market to weed out Polaroid. It wanted its economies of scale to be

To account for their miscalculation in film sales, Kodak is undergoing a massive digitally based shift. Kodak plans on building a stronger base in its consumer, medical, and profession imaging products. However, this shift does not come without a price tag. Kodak’s projected spending could reach as much as $3 billion in future investments to aid the shift. With these investments Kodak claims a tremendous turnaround in revenue. Kodak anticipates reaching $16 billion in revenue by 2006 and $20 billion by 2010. To pay

KONE is a global leader in the elevator and escalator industry. The company is seriously committed to understand the needs of its customers since the previous century, furnishing the industry with elevators, escalators and automatic building doors in addition to innovative solutions for upgrading and maintenance. The strategic objective of KONE is to present the best People Flow™ experience by creating and providing solutions that facilitates people to move smoothly, securely, with ease and devoid of waiting in buildings in a progressively furthering urbanizing environment. (Kone.com, 2014) This paper is an attempt to explore the core competencies, core business strategies and technology management of KONE.

It was Kodak’s’ strategy to sell the cameras at low prices, and it used to earn revenue from the films; this strategy is called the razor-blade strategy. This model for photography became flop when Sony introduced a camera with floppy disk inside, in which there wasn’t any use of films. As a result of Sony’s introduction of the Mavica in 1981, Kodak took it as a threat and started investing in the digital photography. For this purpose, it has conducted a huge research on the digital photography. As exposed by Fisher in 1997, Kodak’s respond wasn’t appropriate for the digital world: “One of the mistakes we [Kodak] have made is that we [Kodak]’ve tried to do it all. We [Kodak] do not have to pursue all aspects of the digital opportunity and service side.”

This report is focusing on the strategies adopted by Canon and the strategies when Canon is facing competitions. This report shows that how Canon survives in the market and keeps its long lasting growth in market and profit.

A business unit can be defined by a set of operating divisions that are organized by market, customer, product, or other means, which essentially act as self-sufficient businesses with separate profits. (Thompson et al 2015).

It is interesting to note the underlying ideologies behind these objectives that Sony Corporation has set.  The national culture is evident in the way these objectives are created, aside from the fact that this work organization was born during the aftermath of the World War II.  Mr. Ibuka has pictured that his company will serve as his contribution for national development, and that technology is the key to their growth.  This is in line with the national advancement that the Japanese government was aiming at then.