Taehyun Chang
ENGR 183EW
July 28 2014 Postmortem Report on Hurricane Katrina
Abstract
Hurricane Katrina and the subsequent flood were the most costly natural disaster in the history of the United States. Nearly 2,000 people died in the entire area where the hurricane and flooding occurred, though this area included vast regions outside of New Orleans metropolitan area. This ethical analysis examines the role of levee design and maintenance, which was under the primary authority of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. The system lacked redundancy, and the various components of the system did not meet the same design standards. For example, some of the levee walls did not meet required standards of height or the proper foundational materials, creating weak spots, while redundancy could have been achieved if the pumping system was adequate to handle a severe hurricane. An ethical analysis guided by the ethical concepts, approaches, and theories of descriptive/normative judgments, virtues, absolutism, and utilitarianism results in two recommendations:
1. The Corps of Engineers should have aggressively lobbied for federal funding for infrastructure improvement, including replacement of low levees, reinforcement of levees made with weak foundational materials, and an improved pumping system. Aggressive lobbying should have included the district officials at the Corps of Engineers potentially resigning their positions in protest if funding was not provided. This would have sent
A running theme throughout most of the literature on Katrina shows that the inability for the bureaucracy to effectively manage the crisis contributed to human suffering, needless death and disenfranchisement, and frankly, in excess and drawn out repairs. What should happen? Again, there are local issues as well as broader national issues. Certainly, though, the billions of dollars in funding that go to crisis management at the national level should be honed and made accountable for doing exactly what their mandate indicates: effectively handling disasters. The money and time spent on cleaning up the disaster, though, led to increased criminal activity in New Orleans, public calls from new leadership, and governmental criticisms. In July 2012,
Even though it is the responsibility of the federal and state governments to aid citizens during times of disaster, the people devastated by Hurricane Katrina were not effectively facilitated as according to their rights as citizens of the United States. The government’s failures to deliver assistance to citizens stem from inadequate protection systems in place before the storm even struck. The Federal Emergency Management Agency and the Department of Homeland Security were the two largest incumbents in the wake of the storm. The failure of these agencies rests on the shoulders of those chosen to head the agency. These directors, appointed by then president George W. Bush, were not capable of leading large government agencies through a
Katrina hit New Orleans, Louisiana on August 29th, 2005, but the failure of the government started before this day “by allowing building and growing in areas in low flood lands.” The government did not regulate these land areas that have always been at a threat for flooding and natural disaster, which was ignored by the government and public, and was in place, still a place for growing infrastructure. Failures included by the author of the national agencies include design limits that can lead to levees being overtopped by flood and hurricane events that are larger than they were designed for and design flaws and construction and maintenance shortcomings that lead to protective works being breached when they cannot stand up to the forces exerted by large flood and hurricane events. The author also points out the problems with the hundred-year flood event, which only has a one percent chance of happening every year. When the NFIP focuses on this possible catastrophe, it losses the
In August of 2005, a great blow was dealt to our country by the disastrous Hurricane Katrina. Where humans thought they could control the awesome power of such a natural disaster through the use of levees, they were wrong. Many of the failures were due to problems with the soil on which the levees were built. In the chapter, we read over many types of changes the planet goes through, and it seems that those key point were not very strongly considered when constructing the levees. Not only was the underlying soil an issue, but different elevation levels from around New Orleans also contributed to the failures.
This case summarizes events preceding the Hurricane Katrina, which was one of the worst natural catastrophes in the modern history of the USA. It raises questions about the lack of reasonable prevention and preparation actions due to flimsy structure and management of the responsible organizations and persons, invalidity and inconsistence of their actions and incapability of making the decisions in a timely manner. As a result of the unstructured and incoherent activities, we could observe several ineffective and costly attempts to mitigate floods and hurricanes. In the beginning the local officials, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers and “White Houses past and present always seem penny-wise and pound-foolish” because of the chain of the wrong
In August 2005, Hurricane Katrina devastated New Orleans, Louisiana and the Gulf Coast. The results were catastrophic. Katrina and storm-related flooding took more than 1,800 lives and caused an estimated $81 billion in damages. In the storm’s aftermath, there was widespread debate over government response to the disaster. I believe that the bulk of the responsibility lay with the state and local governments. They should have been better prepared ahead of time and had more comprehensive plans in place to minimize danger to citizens. The national government has traditionally only sent its military into a state at the request of that state’s governor. The governors of Louisiana and Mississippi did not immediately request that action (Fraga, L.
“When communities are rebuilt, they must be even better and stronger than before the storm,” (“Bush”). This is what former president George W. Bush said during his speech in New Orleans concerning the effects of Hurricane Katrina. Hurricane Katrina was a massive natural disaster that consisted of high powered winds and immense amounts of water. The hurricane was initially a category 3, but gradually rose to the classification of a category 5 storm, which is the largest storm there is (“Hurricane Irene”). In fact, there were accounts of winds recorded at about 127 miles per hour in the Gulf areas such as Grand Isle, Louisiana, and near the Mississippi River (“Hurricane Katrina Statistics”). All of these factors are made
In regards to criticism of government response, the first responders in situation such as this are the local government. They were ill prepared for the magnitude of the damage to the levees, compounded by the large number of individuals unable to evacuate. The Superdome and the Convention Center were designated “refuges of last result” but it is unlikely that they were part of the city’s refuge network. These two structures were merely big enough to accommodate the amount of citizens that were stranded in the city; hence they were lacking the resources necessary to be effective refuges. Social stratification, inadequate evacuation measures, poor leadership among those coordinating relief efforts, ill conceived and equipped refuges, and delayed action in recruiting county, state and federal relief
Hurricane Katrina was the biggest natural calamity in the United States that led to immense loses. The storm affected 92, 000 square miles and damaged much of the major city. More 18, 000 individuals died and thousands became homeless, with no access to basic supplies. The disaster evolved into a sequence of linked series, with two primary causes. The basic cause was the storm itself, but no less significant was the breakdown of the artificial levees intended to safeguard a city constructed below the sea-level. These
555). I have noted that regular assessments and monetarization to policies and regulations is crucial for the implementations to work to their full potential. I have explained how the Love Canal is also classified as a top man-made disaster and with regular toxin monitoring and some assessments to policies, the area is no longer harmful to nearby residents or schools. Though Hurricane Katrina was a major disaster and impacted poor African American’s the hardest, the Corps did learn from the disaster and conducted a project that involved fixing more than half the system of levees, canals, and floodwalls. I was very pleased to learn that the Corps is continuing to monitor the waterway system and even published an updated map “showing block-by-block where flooding would likely occur if a 100-year hurricane were to strike” Layzer pg. 555). Hurricane Katrina has been one of the most expensive disasters ever recorded. However, the extent of the damages to the city of New Orleans could have been minimized with regular monetarization and assessment of the waterway system of the Mississippi River, specifically the levee system. A simple check up on policies or regulations could be matter of life or death
Hurricane Katrina began as tropical Depression twelve, which formed over the Bahamas on August 23, 2005. On August 24, the storm strengthened and became known as Tropical Storm Katrina, the 11th named storm of the 2005 hurricane season. A few hours before making landfall in Florida on August 25, Tropical storm Katrina was upgraded to Hurricane Katrina (Category1, 74mph winds). An analysis by National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration’s (NOAA’s) climate prediction center
The city of New Orleans lies below sea level in a bowl bordered by levees which prevent the high waters of the Mississippi River from flooding the city. These levees were put to the test on August 29, 2005 when Hurricane Katrina hit, causing severe destruction along the Gulf coast. Three concrete floodwalls protecting the city of New Orleans fractured and burst under the weight of surging waters from the hurricane, killing hundreds and resulting in an estimated $100 to $150 billion worth of damage (Luegenbiehl, 2007). In the aftermath of the storm, society placed part of the blame on design flaws that compromised the safety of the levees and endangered the public. Under the Flood Control Act of 1965, Congress had mandated the US Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) to protect the city from a Category 3 storm, yet the floodwalls were unable to withstand the force of Hurricane Katrina, which was eventually classified as Category 3 (Grunwalk & Warrick, 2005). The Corps pointed towards a massive surge that exceeded the height of the floodwalls, but investigations by civil engineers and other experts pointed towards the inadequate design and construction by the Corps of Engineers as the cause of the failure (Englehardt et al., 2013). The Corps acted in a manner contradicting ethical engineering behavior by being less than forthcoming about deficiencies that were accumulating in the overall system. In order to prevent future disasters involving human life, the government should require
(Thiede & Brown, 2013). Lastly, the improper constriction levees and floodwalls will be addressed (Thiede & Brown, 2013). By narrowing down the substantial factors, the government and public can learn from the disaster management mistakes of Hurricane Katrina so aftermath effects can be prevented/alleviated in the future. Recommendations for improving disaster management practices can also be provided and would be beneficial in saving many lives.
While the catastrophic failure of the levees in New Orleans during Hurricane Katrina can be attributed to the Army Corps of Engineers (“Corps”), the Corps’ failures can be attributed to fundamental flaws within the accountability environments they were operating in during both the building and the maintenance of the levees. Legal and bureaucratic accountability were the primary and secondary accountability approaches at work, with legal accountability most notable during their planning and construction process, and bureaucratic accountability taking precedence during their oversight process. Ironically, while these are the forms of accountability that should contain the highest degrees of control, critical failures resulting from each of these accountability environments led to the Corps, in practice, having an extremely low degree of control and ultimately led to the failure of the levees during Hurricane Katrina .
On August 29, 2005, the third strongest and biggest hurricane ever recorded in American history hit the Gulf Coast at eight o’clock a.m. The interaction between a tropical depression and a tropical wave created a tropical storm later referred to as Hurricane Katrina (FAQS, 2013). Forming over the Bahamas, Hurricane Katrina gradually strengthened as it moved closer and closer to the Gulf of Mexico. Recorded on August 28th, 2005, Katrina jumped from a category three storm to a category five storm with maximum sustained winds up to 160 miles per hour. Although other hurricanes, such as Hurricane Rita and Hurricane Wilma, exceeded Katrina, this dominant storm was classified as the fourth most intense hurricane