s each firm's marginal cost is $0.28 per unit? e Cournot-Nash equilibrium occurs where q; equals and 92 equals (Enter numeric responses using real numbera rounded to two decimal places.) rthermore, the equilibrium occurs at a price of S (Round your answer to the nearest penny.)
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- What is the homogeneous-good duopoly Cournot equilibrium if the market demand function is and each firm's marginal cost is $0.28 per unit? The Cournot-Nash equilibrium occurs where q₁ equals and 92 equals Q = 10,000-400p, (Enter numeric responses using real numbers rounded to two decimal places.)Question 1: Suppose Southwest (S) and JetBlue (J) choose a number of flights, qs and qj respectively, from Chicago to New York. They both have the same constant marginal cost of 12. For Q = qs + qj, the market demand function for flights is p = 60 – 2Q (1) Suppose the airlines choose quantity simultaneously. Find the Cournot Nash Equilibrium quantities. (2) Suppose the airlines choose price simultaneously. Find the Bertrand Nash Equilibrium. (3) Suppose Southwest and JetBlue collude in the quantities they choose to obtain monopoly profits. Assuming they split the market evenly, what quantity does each firm choose? (4) Suppose Southwest and JetBlue agree in principle to the collusion in Part (4), but Southwest decides to cheat. What quantity will Southwest choose?Consider a Stackelberg duopoly:There are two firms in an industry with demand Q = 1 − Pd.The “leader” chooses a quantity qL to produce. The “follower” observes qL and chooses a quantity qF.Suppose now that the cost function is Ci(qi) = qi2 for i = L, F. (a) Find the subgame perfect equilibrium. (b) Compare the equilibrium you found with the Nash equilibrium if the game was simultaneous (i.e., Cournot competition). Is the Nash equilibrium of the Cournot game also a Nash equilibrium of the sequential game? Why or why not?
- 1. The market (inverse) demand function for a homogeneous good is P(Q) = 10 - Q. There are two firms: firm 1 has a constant marginal cost of 2 for producing each unit of the good, and firm 2 has a constant marginal cost of 1. The two firms compete by setting their quantities of production, and the price of the good is determined by the market demand function given the total quantity. a. Calculate the Nash equilibrium in this game and the corresponding market price when firms simultaneously choose quantities. b. Now suppose firml moves earlier than firm 2 and firm 2 observes firm 1 quantity choice before choosing its quantity find optimal choices of firm 1 and firm 2.Three firms compete in the style of Cournot. The inverse demand is P(Q) = a - Q. Scenario 1: All three firms have the same constant marginal cost MC = c. Scenario 2: Firm 1 has MC = 0.5c, Firm 2 has MC = c, and Firm 3 has MC = 1.5c. Assume that a > 3c. Which of the following is correct? (Price means the price in Nash equilibrium.) O Price in scenario 1> Price in scenario 2 O Price in scenario 2> Price in scenario 1 O Price in scenario 1 = Price in scenario 2 O Any of the first three options is possible depending on the value of a O Any of the first three options is possible depending on the value of a and c.Consider the following statements about the Stackelberg game from the slides, assuming both firms are identical: (I) Denote by qC the Cournot equilibrium quantity produced by each firm, and by qPC the competitive quantity defined by P(qPC) = c (price equals marginal cost). Let s2 denote a strategy where firm 2 plays q2 = qC if it observes q 1 = qC, and plays q2 = qPC otherwise. Let s 1 denote a strategy where firm 1 plays q1 = qC. Then, (s1,s2) is a Nash equilibrium of the Stackelberg game, but it’s not a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. (II) The first firm is allowed to change its quantity after observing firm 2’s quantity chosen at the second stage. (III) Consumers are worse off in the Stackelberg game compared with the Cournot outcome given the same parameters. Group of answer choices: a. Only II is correct b. Only I is correct. c. All options are incorrect. d. Only III is correct e. More than one option is correct.
- Consider two firms that produce the same good and competesetting quantities. The firms face a linear demand curve given by P(Q) =1 − Q, where the Q is the total quantity offered by the firms. The costfunction for each of the firms is c(qi) = cqi, where 0 < c < 1 and qiis the quantity offered by the firm i = 1, 2. Find the Nash equilibriumoutput choices of the firms, as well as the total output and the price, andcalculate the output and the welfare loss compared to the competitiveoutcome. How would the answer change if the firms compete settingprices? What can we conclude about the relationship between competitionand the number of firms?1. Two firms (A and B) play a competition game (i.e. Cournot) in which they can choose any Qi from 0 to ¥. The firms have the same cost functions C(Qi) = 10Qi + 0.5Qi2, and thus MCi = 10 + Qi. They face a market demand curve of P = 220 – (QA + QB). Now assume firm A chooses quantity first. Firm B observes this choice and then chooses its own quantity. d)Firm A has MRA = 150 – 4QA/3. What are the equilibrium QA and QB selected in this game? e)What is the equilibrium price, and how much profit does each firm collect?Consider a market for crude oil production. There are two firms in the market. The marginal cost of firm 1 is 20, while that of firm 2 is 20. The marginal cost is assumed to be constant. The inverse demand for crude oil is P(Q)=200-Q, where Q is the total production in the market. These two firms are engaging in Cournot competition. Find the production quantity of firm 1 in Nash equilibrium. If necessary, round off two decimal places and answer up to one decimal place.
- Suppose that two firms produce mountain spring water and the market demand for mountain spring water is given as follows: P= 254 - 91 - 92 Firm 1 and Firm 2 have a MC = 50 a) Find the Cournot-Nash equilibrium price and quantity of each firm. b) Assume now that firm 1 becomes the Stackelberg leader. What will be the market price, output by each firm? Compared to part a, who gains? c) If Firm 1 chooses a quantity, then Firm 2 chooses a quantity (having observed Firm 1's quantity), then Firm 1 has an opportunity to revise its quantity (having observed Firm 2's quantity), then payoffs are determined, does either firm stand to gain relative to the case of simultaneous quantity choice? Why or why not? (hint: there is no need to do any calculation here).1.7. In Section 1.2.B, we analyzed the Bertrand duopoly model with differentiated products. The case of homogeneous productsConsider a market that only includes two large firms. The (inverse) market demand is P = 100 – Q. 3q2. Firm 1 has a cost function of C, = 2q1, and firm 2 has a cost function of C2 Use a Cournot model to calculate the Nash equilibrium outputs q, and q2 of the two firms. and 92 (a) Give each firm's profit as a function of (b) Compute the Nash equilibrium q, and q2.
