Consider a market that only includes two large firms. The (inverse) market demand is P = 100 – Q. Firm 1 has a cost function of C = 2q1, and firm 2 has a cost function of C2 = 392. %3D Use a Cournot model to calculate the Nash equilibrium outputs q, and q2 of the two firms. (a) Give each firm's profit as a function of and (b) Compute the Nash equilibrium q, and q2.
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Answer:
Given:
Inverse market demand function:
(a).
Profit: it refers to the difference between the total revenue and total cost.
Equation 1 1and equation 2 are the profit functions of firm 1 and firm 2 respectively.
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- 1. The market (inverse) demand function for a homogeneous good is P(Q) = 10 - Q. There are two firms: firm 1 has a constant marginal cost of 2 for producing each unit of the good, and firm 2 has a constant marginal cost of 1. The two firms compete by setting their quantities of production, and the price of the good is determined by the market demand function given the total quantity. a. Calculate the Nash equilibrium in this game and the corresponding market price when firms simultaneously choose quantities. b. Now suppose firml moves earlier than firm 2 and firm 2 observes firm 1 quantity choice before choosing its quantity find optimal choices of firm 1 and firm 2.QUESTION 13 Consider a market where two firms (1 and 2) produce differentiated goods and compete in prices. The demand for firm 1 is given by D₁(P₁, P2) = 140 - 2p1 + P2 and demand for firm 2's product is D2 (P1, P2) 140 - 2p2 + P1 Both firms have a constant marginal cost of 20. What is the Nash equilibrium price of firm 1? (Only give a full number; if necessary, round to the lower integer; no dollar sign.)The market demand function is Each firm has a marginal cost of m = $0.28. Firm 1, the leader, acts before Firm 2, the follower. Solve for the Stackelberg-Nash equilibrium quantities, prices, and profits. The Stackelberg-Nash equilibrium quantities are The Stackelberg-Nash equilibrium price is Profits for the firms are and 92 p = $ π2 $ = Q=7,000 1,000p. 91 and units units. (Enter your responses as whole numbers.) (Enter your response rounded to two decimal places.) π₁ = $ (Enter your responses rounded to two decimal places.)
- QUESTION 10 Suppose there are two firms that produce an identical product. The demand curve for the product is given by P = 62 - Q where Q is the total quantity produced by the two firms. Both firms choose their individual quantities qı20 and q22 0 simultaneously. Each firm has a marginal cost of 37. What is the market price when both firms produce the quantities in the unique Nash equilibrium? Give your answer as a number to two decimal places.Exercise 6.7. Suppose two identical companies produce wood stoves and they are the only ones on the market. Its costs are given by: C1 (q1 )=200q1 and C2 (q2) = 200q2. And the inverse market demand curve is: P=2000-2Q, where Q =q1 + q2 Get the Cournot-Nash equilibrium. Calculate the profits of each company. Show graphically. Suppose that the two companies form a cartel to maximize joint profits. How many stoves will you produce? Calculate the profits of each company. Represent graphically. Managers now note that explicit agreements to collude are illegal. Each company must decide on its own whether to produce the amount of Cournot or that of the cartel.Consider the following normal form representation of the standard competition between firm A and firm B. Each firm can choose either standard A or standard B. Their payoffs are given as follows: Firm B A В A Firm A В 1 1 3 1 (1) (10 points) What's Nash equilibrium (NE) in this game? If there are more than one, find them all. But there is no NE, state that there is no NE. (2) (10 points) If you find a NE (or multiple Nash equilibria), is it (or are they) Pareto efficient?
- Consider two ice cream sellers competing at a beach that is 1000 metres long. Ice cream prices are fixed by the ice cream company, but companies can choose their locations simultaneously. Customers are located uniformly (spread out evenly on the beach) and do not like walking. The cost of walking every metre is the same (i.e. linear cost). a) Suppose there are three ice cream sellers that locate simultaneously. Find the Nash equilibrium is there is one. Else, explain why there is none. (Focus on pure strategy Nash equilibria)2 firms are engaged in Cournot competition; firm A faces the cost curveCA(yA)=40yAand firm Bfaces the cost curveCB(yB)=40yB. The inverse market demand curve isP(y)=100y, whereyrepresents market level of output. a)Define the Cournot game. b)In 1 or 2 sentences explain why a firm has no incentive to deviate from the Cournot Nash equilibrium(holding their opponent’s strategy constant). c)Find the Cournot Nash Equilibrium. d)Now suppose instead of playing their strategies at the same time, firm A moves first and then firm B moves second(sequentialgame).Does firm A earn higher profits in this game or the game in part c)?Consider the following Cournot game with two firms i = 1, 2. The demand function is P(Q) = 100 − Q, with Q = q1 + q2. The production costs for firm i are: C(qi) = 400 + 2qi . Find the nash equilibrium of this game. plz answer correct calculatuon asap plz dont answer by pepar
- Problem 3. Consider the following game with three firms. First, firms 1 and 2 si- multancously choose quantities q1 and q2 respectively. After observing firm 1 and 2's quantities, firm 3 chooses its quantity q3. There is no production cost and the inverse demand function is p= 12 – (91 +2 + 93). (a) Compute the SPNE of this game. (b) Give an example of Nash equilibrium s* with s = 4 and s, = 6 , that is not subgame perfect. game theory questionThe market demand function is Q=10,000-1,000p. Each firm has a marginal cost of m=$0.28. Firm 1, the leader, acts before Firm 2, the follower. Solve for the Stackelberg-Nash equilibrium quantities, prices, and profits. Compare your solution to the Cournot-Nash equilibrium. The Stackelberg-Nash equilibrium quantities are: q1=___________ units and q2=____________units The Stackelberg-Nash equilibrium price is: p=$_____________ Profits for the firms are profit1=$_______________ and profit2=$_______________ The Cournot-Nash equilibrium quantities are: q1=______________units and q2=______________units The Cournot-Nash equilibrium price is: p=$______________ Profits for the firms are profit1=$_____________ and profit2=$_______________Two countries produce oil. The per unit production cost of Country 1 is C1 = $2 and of country 2 it is C2 = $4. The total demand for oil is Q = 40-p where p is the market price of a unit of oil. Each country can only produce either 5 units, 10 units or 15 units. The total production of the two countries in a Nash equilibrium is 10 15 20 25 30