Two ready-to-eat breakfast cereal manufacturers, Lots of Sugar and Buckets of Goo, face combined demand for their products given by Q = 75 - P. Their total costs are given by TCLots of Sugar = 0.1Q2Lots of Sugar and TCBuckets of Goo = 5QBuckets of Goo. If they successfully collude, their total profits will be: a. $62.50 b. $1,250.00 c. $125.00 d. $287.50 e. $1,287.50

Two ready-to-eat breakfast cereal manufacturers, Lots of Sugar and Buckets of Goo, face combined demand for their products given by Q = 75 - P. Their total costs are given by TCLots of Sugar = 0.1Q2Lots of Sugar and TCBuckets of Goo = 5QBuckets of Goo. If they successfully collude, their total profits will be: a. $62.50 b. $1,250.00 c. $125.00 d. $287.50 e. $1,287.50

Economics:

10th Edition

ISBN:9781285859460

Author:BOYES, William

Publisher:BOYES, William

Chapter26: Monopolistic Competition And Oligopoly

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 1E

See similar textbooks

Similar questions

In a market there are five firms, all have a total cost curve equal to CT = 2q. The market demand is Q = 500 - 5P. How much profit would each firm get if they collude and share the market equitably? What is the profit to each firm if they agree to collude, but one firm misleads the others charging a slightly lower price? What is the profit if all firms do not collude and compete via price?
There are only two driveway paving companies in a small town, Asphalt, Inc. and Blacktop Bros. The inverse demand curve for the services is ? = 2040 − 20?where quantity is measured in pave jobs per month and price, in dollars per job. The firms have an identical marginal cost of $200 per driveway. If the two firms collude, splitting the work and profits evenly, how many driveways will each firm pave, and at what price? How much profit will each firm make? Does Asphalt have an incentive to cheat by paving one more driveway each month? Show it numerically.
Compare the profits of Firm A when both firms respect the collusive agreement to the profits of Firm A when Firm A secretly cheats on the agreement. How much additional profit would Firm A earn by secretly cheating on the agreement to collude? Round your answer to the nearest whole number.
There are two ice-cream parols on a beach. The dayly demand for ice-creams is given by Q = 3252 - 7p. The average variable cost of an ice-cream is 83 while the rent of the place is 576. How many ice-creams is one company selling if the two ice-cream stands operate as Cournot duopolists? (Please use 2 decimals in your answer.)
You are given the market demand function Q = 1500-1000p, and that each duopoly firm's marginal cost is $0.20 per unit, which implies the cost function: C(qi) = 0.20qi, assuming no fixed costs for i = 1, 2. The cooperative Cournot quantities are q₁ and 92 = The cooperative Cournot price is $ (round to the nearest penny). Calculate the cooperative Cournot profits: firm 1 $ and firm 2 $ (enter your responses as whole numbers). (round both responses to the nearest cent).
Help me please
1. if the total cost function for this market is TC = 500 + 10Q2 , calculate the total and marginal costs for each of the quantities in the table. what is the demand function for this market? 2. What are the profit-maximizing quantity, price, and profit for this market? 3. If there are two firms Atlas and Bowden in this market with the same earlier total cost function and they engage in Cournot competition, what is each firm's equilibrium quantity, price, and profit? [NB: round quantities to nearest integer to find equilibrium quantity, price, and profit]
Only two firms, Acme and Stuff Inc., sell a particular product. The table below shows the demand curve for their product. Each firm has the same constant marginal cost of $10 and zero fixed cost (so MC-ATC=$10). Price Quantity Total Revenues 10 70 65 60 55 50 45 40 28889 35 30 25 20 15 10 15 0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800 900 1000 1100 1200 1300 1400 0 If Acme and Stuff Inc are able to collude, how much will Acme produce? 6500 12000 16500 20000 22500 24000 24500 24000 22500 20000 16500 12000 6500 0
In January 2007, XM enjoyed about 58 percent of satellite radio subscribers, and Sirius had the remaining 42 percent. Both firms were suffering losses, despite their dominance in the satellite radio market. In 2008, the DOJ decided not to challenge a merger, and these two firms united to become Sirius XM. If you were an economic consultant for Sirius, what economic arguments would you have presented to the DOJ to persuade it not to challenge the merger? Explain
Please solve it quickly you can upload handwritten answer also. Consider Atlanta as an oligopoly market with five airlines that behave in a Cournot Model fashion. The Atlanta market demand schedule is: P = 390 - .5*Q. The Cost schedule for Delta is: MC=AC=Scomp=80. The Cost schedule for the other four firms (United, Southwest, et al) is: MC=AC=Scomp=40. What is Delta’s new market share?
In the aeronautical market, Boing and Airbus constitute a duopoly in the production of large airplanes. The American firm has the following cost structure C(qa) = 20 + 39a + qả, and the European firm, C(qe) 150 – P, answer the following questions. = 50 + qe + q?. If the market demand for large airplanes is given by Qp = 9a + qe = a) Interpret the cost structures of both firms b) What would be the equilibrium (quantity, price, and profit) if firms compete by quantity as in Cournot and interpret your answer. c) If they decide to form a cartel, what are the new quantities, prices, and profits? Interpret your answer using the Game Theory insights. d) Calculate now what would happen if Airbus is the leader (Stackelberg model) in terms of quantity, price, and profit and interpret your outcomes.
If both firms operate independently and do not collude, the most likely economic profit is