Suppose rules of the scenario change such that Village1 and Village2 are having a conflict on the ownership of this stream of nearby river. If both villages decide not to battle against each other, V1 will receive a monetary gain of 20S while V2 will receive a monetary gain of 50$. However, if both decide to battle, there is no monetary gain for both. If V1 decides to attach V2 but V2 stays neutral, V1 receives a gain of 80$ while V2 gets 60S. V2 will get 80S if it attacks V1 and in return V1 does not attack. In this scenario, Vl's monetary gain would be just 10s. You are required to construct the pay-off matrix of this scenario.

Suppose rules of the scenario change such that Village1 and Village2 are having a conflict on the ownership of this stream of nearby river. If both villages decide not to battle against each other, V1 will receive a monetary gain of 20S while V2 will receive a monetary gain of 50$. However, if both decide to battle, there is no monetary gain for both. If V1 decides to attach V2 but V2 stays neutral, V1 receives a gain of 80$ while V2 gets 60S. V2 will get 80S if it attacks V1 and in return V1 does not attack. In this scenario, Vl's monetary gain would be just 10s. You are required to construct the pay-off matrix of this scenario.

ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

14th Edition

ISBN:9780190931919

Author:NEWNAN

Publisher:NEWNAN

Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 1QTC

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