Consider a homogeneous-product Cournot ollgopoly of 3 firms with cost functions TC(a) = 24, Sup- pose that the Inverse demand function Is P(Q) = 30 - Q. (a) Solve for Cournot-Nash equilibrlum.
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Consider a homogeneous-product Cournot ollgopoly of 3 firms with cost functions TC(a) = 24, Sup- pose that the Inverse demand function Is P(Q) = 30 - Q.
(a) Solve for Cournot-Nash equilibrlum.
(b) Firm 1 and Firm 2 merge Into Firm A. Solve for the new Cournot-Nash equilibrlum. Provide an Intultive explanation for the decrease In the combined profit of the merged firms.
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- The demand the duopoly firms face is p = 100 – 2Q where Q = q1 + q2. Each firm has the following cost function: c(qi) = 40 + qi2/2, i = 1, 2. Using calculus, determine the Stackelberg equilibrium. determine the Cournot equilibrium. plz answer correct calculation asap plz Dont answer by pen pepar plzConsider a homogenous product duopoly in which the two firms, 1 and 2, compete by choosing their respective quantities, Q1 and Q2. Market demand is given by Q=20−P, where P is the market price and Q= Q1+Q2. Firm 2’s total costs are given by TC2 = 2Q2 , while firm 1’s total costs areTC1= Q1^2 . (a) calculate To which firm would the ability to move first be most valuable? Explain fully. Note:- Do not provide handwritten solution. Maintain accuracy and quality in your answer. Take care of plagiarism. Answer completely. You will get up vote for sure.What is the homogeneous-good duopoly Cournot equilibrium if the market demand function is Q= 1,800 - 1,000p. and each firm's marginal cost is $0.28 per unit? The Cournot-Nash equilibrium occurs where q, equals and 92 equals (Enter numenic responses using real numbers rounded to two decimai places.) Furthermore, the equilibrium occurs at a price of $ (Round your answer to the nearest penny.)
- The demand is homogenous product, Cournot duopoly is P=100 -2(Q1+Q2) and the costs are C1=20Q1 and C2=15Q2 1. Determine the reaction function of each firm II. Calculate each firm's equilibrium output. II. Calculate market price. note : do it word form inverse marketConsider a duopoly with a demand curve given by P = a –bQ, where a and b are positive constants and Q is the total production by the two firms. Firms sell identical goods and have an identical constant marginal cost of production c. Fixed costs are equal to zero. We assume firms choose quantities simultaneously (Cournot competition). a. Obtain the first order condition of profit maximization for each firm. Use graphical analysis and economic intuition to explain what they represent. [30%] b. Obtain the profit maximizing quantity for each firm. Explain what they represent using game theory concepts. [20%] c. Demonstrate using relevant graphical analysis and economic intuition that the results obtained in b are not a Pareto Optimum for the firms involved. [20%] d. How would the graphical analysis in part a change if Firm A had a fixed cost of production?Assume firms' marginal and average costs are constant and equal to c and that inverse market demand is given by P = a - bQ where a, b > 0. Suppose now the market is served by 2 firms that choose quantities for their identical products simultaneously. Calculate: i. ii. iii. iv. The Nash equilibrium prices for Cournot duopolists Firm output Market out Firm profit
- 1. Best responses in a Cournot Oligopoly Firm A and Firm B sell identical goods Total market demand for the good is: The inverse demand function is therefore 1 P(QM) = 780 -Q=780 -0.02222QM 45 QM is total market production (i.e., combined production of firm's A and B. That is: Q(P) = 35, 100- 45P 2M = A +QB As a result, the inverse demand curve for each firm is: P(QA, QB) = 780- -1/32₁-752 45 Unlike the example in class, the two firms have different costs. = 4000A TCA (QA) TCB (QB) = 260QB = 780 -0.022220A -0.02222QB a. Using the demand function and the cost functions above, what is firm A's profit function. b. Using the profit function above and assuming that firm B produces Qg, calculate what firm A's best response is to firm B’s decision to produce QB- Note: Firm A's best response should be a function of BAssume firms' marginal and average costs are constant and equal to c and that inverse market demand is given by P = a - bQ where a, b > 0. Suppose now the market is served by 2 firms (one leader, and one follower) that choose quantities for their identical products. Calculate: i. ii. iii. iv. The Nash equilibrium quantities for the Stackelberg duopolists Market output Market price Firm profitBonus question Competition à la Cournot with homogenous goods and asymmetric incomplete information. Consider a duopoly that competes à la Cournot (choosing quantities simultane- ously), facing inverse demand function p(Q) = a – Q where Q = q1 + 92, where the cost function for firm 1 is c1 (91) = cqı with c > 0 which is common knowledge for both firms. The cost function for firm 2 is not common knowledge and can be c2(42) = Cí42 with probability 0 € (0, 1) or c2(92) = CL92 with probability 1- 0, where CL < CH- The notation Cz means low cost and CH means high cost. Firm 2 can be a new entrant to the industry, or could have just invented a new technology. Firm 2 knows its marginal cost which means it has private information since it know if it is Cz or CH. Firm 1 on the other hand does not know the marginal cost of firm 2 (we don't either) and therefore it has less information than firm 2 and therefore constitutes asymmetric information. Firm 2 may want to choose a different (presumably…
- Assume firms' marginal and average costs are constant and equal to c and that inverse market demand is given by P = a - bQ where a, b > 0. Suppose now the market is served by k firms that choose quantities for their identical products simultaneously. Calculate: i. ii. iii. iv. The Nash equilibrium quantities for the Cournot firms as functions of k. 2 Market output and price as a function of k Firm profit as a function of k Using your answers in i, ii, iii and iv, describe what happen to firm output, market output, market price and firm profit as the number of firms increases.Problem 1. HHI in the Bertrand Triopoly Equilibrium It's a Bertrand Triopoly - hence we know there are 3 firms in the industry-in-question, who competes in "price". The inverse demand functions for Firm 1, 2, and 3 are as follows: q1 = 40 - 1.5p1 +0.5p2 +p3 q2 = 40 + 1.5p1 - 3p2+p3 q3 = 40 + 2p1 + 1.5p2 - 4p3 For each firm, the marginal cost of production is $2.50/unit produced and sold. Apparently, the firms' products are differentiated. You cannot impose symmetry across firms. Therefore, please solve each firm's profit maximization problem, impose equilibrium, and solve for each firm's "action" in equilibrium. After that, please calculate the Herfindahl- Hirschman Index (HHI) in the industry in equilibrium.1. Consider two duopolists who each have a constant marginal cost c = e2 = 3 and face inverse demand P = 15 – Q,where Q = Q1 + Q2 is the total output of both firms. 1. Find the Cournot equilibrium quantity for each firm, the resulting market price, and the profits for each firm. 2. Find the Stackelberg equilibrium quantities for each firm, and the price, and the profits for each firm supposing that Firm 1 is the industry leader. 3. Suppose that Firm 2 figures out a way to lower its marginal cost to ez = 0 while firm 1 still has a marginal cost equal to 1: c = 3. How does this affect the Cournot equilibrium quantities, price, and profits? 4. How does this affect the Stackelberg equilibrium (with Firm 1 still as the leader) quantities, price, and profits?
