All question are with regards to the following set up. There are two firms A and B. Firms compete in a Cournot Duopoly in Karhide. They set quantities q4 and qB. Inverse demand is P(9A + 9B) = 18 - 9A-9B and costs are C(q) = 3 * q for both firms. Firm B is a domestic firm (in Karhide,) and firm A is a foreign firm (from Orgoreyn.) The government of Karhide engages n a strategic trade intervention by giving firm B a per unit subsidy of s. (That is, when firm B produces and sells qB units, firm B receives a payment of s* qB from the government.) You must show your work at each step, unless the questions is followed by "No work required."

Microeconomic Theory
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ISBN:9781337517942
Author:NICHOLSON
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Chapter15: Imperfect Competition
Section: Chapter Questions
Problem 15.6P
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3) Assume that s = 3.
(a) Find firm B’s profit function under the subsidy. (No work required.)
(b) Find firm B’s best response function.(You may do this directly or by setting s to zero in your
expressions from (1b).
(c) Why don’t I need to ask you to solve for A’s best response?
(d) Solve for the equilibrium outputs (q*A, q*b ).
(e) Solve for the equilibrium price.
(f) Solve for firm B profits.

Can you please answer the last 3 questions 

All question are with regards to the following set up. There are two firms A and B. Firms
compete in a Cournot Duopoly in Karhide. They set quantities qA and qB. Inverse demand is
P(9A + 9B) = 18 - 9A-9B and costs are C(q) = 3 * q for both firms. Firm B is a domestic firm
(in Karhide,) and firm A is a foreign firm (from Orgoreyn.) The government of Karhide engages
in a strategic trade intervention by giving firm B a per unit subsidy of s. (That is, when firm B
produces and sells q3 units, firm B receives a payment of s * qB from the government.)
You must show your work at each step, unless the questions is followed by "No work required."
Transcribed Image Text:All question are with regards to the following set up. There are two firms A and B. Firms compete in a Cournot Duopoly in Karhide. They set quantities qA and qB. Inverse demand is P(9A + 9B) = 18 - 9A-9B and costs are C(q) = 3 * q for both firms. Firm B is a domestic firm (in Karhide,) and firm A is a foreign firm (from Orgoreyn.) The government of Karhide engages in a strategic trade intervention by giving firm B a per unit subsidy of s. (That is, when firm B produces and sells q3 units, firm B receives a payment of s * qB from the government.) You must show your work at each step, unless the questions is followed by "No work required."
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