Assume that there are two parties, I and V. I engages in an activity that tends to injure V. V and both can take care to reduce the expected harm from accidents. Specifically, suppose that if I takes no care (i.e., spends $0 on accident precautions), expected injury to V is $250. If I spends $40 on accident precautions, however, the expected injury to V is reduced to $175. Further suppose that V has a choice between taking no care or spending $50 in care to avoid accidents. If V spends $50 in care, V's expected harm falls by $20 regardless of the level of care that I takes. Assume that courts adopt the socially-optimal level of injurer care as the negligence standard. That is, if I takes less than the socially-optimal level of care, she will be found negligent and must pay for all damages to V. If I takes at least the socially optimal level of care, she will not have to compensate V for his damages. 9. Under a negligence standard, what is l's dominant strategy? a) b) c) d) e) I does not have a dominant strategy. Spend $0 on precautions. Spend $40 on precautions. Spend $40 on precautions only if V takes no precautions. None of the above.
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- Assume that there are two parties, I and V. I engages in an activity that tends to injure V. V and I both can take care to reduce the expected harm from accidents. Specifically, suppose that if I takes no care (i.e., spends $0 on accident precautions), expected injury to V is $25. If I spends $5 on accident precautions, however, the expected injury to V is reduced to $18. Further suppose that V has a choice between taking no care or spending $4 in care to avoid accidents. If V spends $4 in care, V’s expected harm falls by $2 regardless of the level of care that I takes. Assume that courts adopt the socially-optimal level of injurer care as the negligence standard. That is, if I takes less than the socially-optimal level of care, she will be found negligent and must pay for all damages to V. If I takes at least the socially optimal level of care, she will not have to compensate V for his damages. What is the Nash equilibrium of this game under a rule of no liability? Question…Use the following information for questions 12-14. Assume that there are two parties, I and V. I engages in an activity that tends to injure V. V and I both can take care to reduce the expected harm from accidents. Specifically, suppose that if I takes no care (i.e., spends $0 on accident precautions), expected injury to V is $25. If I spends $5 on accident precautions, however, the expected injury to V is reduced to $18. Further suppose that V has a choice between taking no care or spending $4 in care to avoid accidents. If V spends $4 in care, V’s expected harm falls by $2 regardless of the level of care that I takes. Assume that courts adopt the socially-optimal level of injurer care as the negligence standard. That is, if I takes less than the socially-optimal level of care, she will be found negligent and must pay for all damages to V. If I takes at least the socially optimal level of care, she will not have to compensate V for his damages. What is the Nash equilibrium of this…Use the following information for questions 12-14. Assume that there are two parties, I and V. I engages in an activity that tends to injure V. V and I both can take care to reduce the expected harm from accidents. Specifically, suppose that if I takes no care (i.e., spends $0 on accident precautions), expected injury to V is $25. If I spends $5 on accident precautions, however, the expected injury to V is reduced to $18. Further suppose that V has a choice between taking no care or spending $4 in care to avoid accidents. If V spends $4 in care, V’s expected harm falls by $2 regardless of the level of care that I takes. Assume that courts adopt the socially-optimal level of injurer care as the negligence standard. That is, if I takes less than the socially-optimal level of care, she will be found negligent and must pay for all damages to V. If I takes at least the socially optimal level of care, she will not have to compensate V for his damages. Under a negligence standard, what are…
- Use the following information for questions 12-14. Assume that there are two parties, I and V. I engages in an activity that tends to injure V. V and I both can take care to reduce the expected harm from accidents. Specifically, suppose that if I takes no care (i.e., spends $0 on accident precautions), expected injury to V is $25. If I spends $5 on accident precautions, however, the expected injury to V is reduced to $18. Further suppose that V has a choice between taking no care or spending $4 in care to avoid accidents. If V spends $4 in care, V’s expected harm falls by $2 regardless of the level of care that I takes. Assume that courts adopt the socially-optimal level of injurer care as the negligence standard. That is, if I takes less than the socially-optimal level of care, she will be found negligent and must pay for all damages toV. If I takes at least the socially optimal level of care, she will not have to compensate V for his damages. Under a negligence standard, what are…Use the following information for questions 12-14. Assume that there are two parties, I and V. I engages in an activity that tends to injure V. V and I both can take care to reduce the expected harm from accidents. Specifically, suppose that if I takes no care (i.e., spends $0 on accident precautions), expected injury to V is $25. If I spends $5 on accident precautions, however, the expected injury to V is reduced to $18. Further suppose that V has a choice between taking no care or spending $4 in care to avoid accidents. If V spends $4 in care, V’s expected harm falls by $2 regardless of the level of care that I takes. Assume that courts adopt the socially-optimal level of injurer care as the negligence standard. That is, if I takes less than the socially-optimal level of care, she will be found negligent and must pay for all damages toV. If I takes at least the socially optimal level of care, she will not have to compensate V for his damages. Under a negligence standard, what is…Suppose John buys a tiger because he wants to be like the cool king guy from The Walking Dead. John can take care to prevent his tiger from eating his neighbors by building a fence. The fence costs less than the expected harm to John’s neighbors that building the fence will prevent. Suppose that John’s neighbors also can take precautions, like wearing tiger-proof armor or carrying large caliber rifles with them at all times. Assume that the cost of these precautions is less than the expected harm from tiger maulings they will prevent, even if John were to build the fence. Given these circumstances, which is likely to be the most efficient rule? A. No liability B. Negligence C. Strict liability D. Strict liability and negligence provide equivalent incentives E. None of the above
- Suppose John buys a tiger because he wants to be like the cool king guy from The Walking Dead. John can take care to prevent his tiger from eating his neighbors by building a fence. The fence costs less than the expected harm to John’s neighbors that building the fence will prevent. Suppose that John’s neighbors also can take precautions, like wearing tiger-proof armor or carrying large caliber rifles with them at all times. Assume that the cost of these precautions is less than the expected harm from tiger maulings they will prevent, even if John were to build the fence. Given these circumstances, which is likely to be the most efficient rule? Question 41 options: a) No liability b) Negligence c) Strict liability d) Strict liability and negligence provide equivalent incentives e) None of the above1. Mr. Smith can cause an accident, which entails a monetary loss of $1000 to Ms. Adams. The likelihood of the accident depends on the precaution decisions by both individuals. Specifically, each individual can choose either "low" or "high" precaution, with the low precaution requiring no cost and the high precaution requiring the effort cost of $200 to the individual who chooses the high precaution. The following table describes the probability of an accident for each combination of the precaution choices by the two individuals. Adams chooses low precaution Adams chooses high precaution Smith chooses low precaution Smith chooses high precaution 0.8 0.5 0.7 0.1 1) What is the socially efficient outcome? For each of the following tort rules, (i) construct a table describing the individuals' payoffs under different precaution pairs and (ii) find the equilibrium precaution choices by the individuals. 2) a) No liability b) Strict liability (with full compensation) c) Negligence rule (with…Suppose that the buyers do not know the quality of any particular bicycle for sale, but the sellers do knowthe quality of the bike they sell. The price at which a bike is traded is determined by demand and supply.Each buyer wants at most one bicycle.(ii) Assuming that each buyer purchases a bike only if its expected quality is higher than the price,and each seller is willing to sell their bike only if the price exceeds their valuation, what is theequilibrium outcome in this market?
- ЕОC 12.02 Suppose you are the mayor of a town and you want to increase safety at an intersection. A traffic light will increase safety and reduce fatality risk by 0.5% but costs $100,000. Suppose the value of human life is estimated at $10 million. Should you spend the money to install the traffic light? (Hint: to multiply 1% by 200 you follow this process: 0.01 x 200 = 2). Select an answer and submit. For keyboard navigation, use the up/down arrow keys to select an answer. a Yes, since the expected benefit ($500,000) exceeds the cost. b Yes, since the expected benefit ($150,000) exceeds the cost. No, since the expected benefit ($50,000) is lower than the cost. d No, since the expected benefit ($15,000) is lower than the cost.Suppose that speeding imposes externalities on other people resulting in a social cost of $50. A town is considering hiring an extra police officer to give out speeding tickets. If we want to maximize social welfare (absent enforcement costs), which 13. of the following statements are true? (Assume risk neutral drivers.) If the probability of detection with the extra police officer is 10%, then a a) speeding ticket should cost $55. If the probability of detection with the extra police officer is 10%, then a b) speeding ticket should cost $500. If the probability of detection with the extra police officer is 100%, then no one c) will speed. If the probability of detection with the extra police officer is 90%, then a speeding ticket should cost $59 None of the above d) e) What happens to the socially optimal cost of the speeding ticket if the town decides to hire the police officer? 14. b) It goes up a) It goes down c) The amount that it goes down depends on salary of the police officer…Tyler just wrecked his new Nissan, and the accident was his fault. The owner of the other vehicle got two estimates for the repairs: one was for $803 and the other was for $852. Tyler is thinking of keeping the insurance companies out of the incident to keep his driving record “clean.” Tyler’s deductible on his comprehensive coverage insurance is $500, and he doesnot want his premium to increase because of the accident. In this regard, Tyler estimates that his semi-annual premium will rise by $60 if he files a claim against his insurance company. In view of the above information, Tyler’s initial decision is to write a personal check for $803 payable to the owner of the other vehicle. Did Tyler make the most economical decision?What other options should Tyler have explored? In your answer, be sure to state your assumptions and quantify your thinking.