Principal curvature

Free Cash Flow, Issuance Costs, and Macroeconomics Risk  Qiaozhi Hu Questrom School of Business Boston University June 30, 2015  I thank Dirk Hackbarth, Andrew Lyaso and MF930 participants at Boston University for helpful comments. Send correspondence to Qiaozhi Hu, Boston University Questrom School of Business, 595 Commonwealth Ave, Boston, MA 02215, USA; telephone: (732)809-1105. E-mail: qiaozhih@bu.edu. 1 Free Cash Flow, Issuance Costs, and Macroeconomics Risk Abstract This research proposal

Introduction Microfinance are the financial institutions who provide loans or funds to individuals who do not possess the actual documents which can be submitted to banks to seek/borrow loans. These individuals can be entrepreneurs and small scale business owners. Microfinance institutions mostly function in developing countries when compared to developed countries. They are almost similar to banks with regards to the nature of functioning, for instance, they fund people who would like to start a

State-owned enterprises are regarded as a particular circumstance of business organisations and considered as the basis of economic growth in many countries (Zhang, 2011). It can be seen that the proportion of state-owned companies has increased from nine percent in 2005 to 23 percent in 2014 especially in China which has a proportion of 15 percent in 2014 (PwC, 2015). Furthermore, state-owned companies might be a necessary tool for development in emerging countries, because they can be directed

organization: one boss (or “Principal”) and one worker (or “Agent”). One of the earliest applications of this Principal-Agent model was to sharecropping, where the landowner was the Principal and the tenant farmer the Agent, but in this course we will typically talk about more familiar organization structures. For example, we might consider a firm’s shareholders to be the Principal and the CEO to be the Agent. One can also enrich the model to analyze a chain of command (i.e., a Principal, a Supervisor, and

CHAPTER - 5 DISCUSSIONS AND CONCLUSIONS Introduction This chapter summarizes the analytical findings and draws conclusions. The findings and the relevance of them for implementation and limitations and scope for further research are described. This study on knowledge transfer, a process in the overall schema of knowledge management, as fostering continual improvement of the organization was done at High Pressure Boiler Plant of Bharat Heavy Electricals Limited Tiruchirappalli. Knowledge transfer

Prescriptive Analytics for Cyber Security Anomaly Detection Algorithm Status and Future Steps Xinle (Liam) Wang E295, MEng in IEOR University of California, Berkeley   Introduction: Our capstone project team is working on Prescriptive Analytics for Cyber Security. The project mainly consists of two parts – building a predictive anomaly detection algorithm that detects suspicious cyber anomalies based on multiple cyber datasets, and implementing a prescriptive model which optimizes the output from

T.F.Chen [9] segmentation is the process of portioning the images, where we need to find the particular portion, there are several methods segmentation such as active contour, etc. segmentation can be done both manually and automatically. Here the new technique of segmentation known as level sets segmentation are described, the level set segmentation reduces the problems of finding the curves which is enclose with respect to the region of interest. The implementation of this involves the normal

Introduction Polit and Beck (2006) indicated that a research critique is a mechanism to provide feedback for improvement on a research article. The Oxford College Dictionary (2014) defines critique as an evaluation of a subject, object or intention in a detailed and analytical way for the purpose of establishing basis for improvement. Additionally, the objective of a research critique is to establish the usability, reliability and applicability of general research findings to a particular situation

shareholders are not completely in charge; the cost can usually be best spent on providing proper material incentives and moral incentives for agents to properly execute their duties, thereby aligning the interests of shareholders (owners) and agents. The principals (the shareholders) have to find ways of ensuring that their agents (the managers) act in their interests. This means incurring costs, ‘agency costs’, to (a) monitor managers’ behavior, and (b) create incentive schemes and control for managers to

supposition that explains the relationship between principals and agents in business. Agency theory is concerned with resolving problems that can exist in agency relationships; that is, between principals (such as shareholders) and agents of the principals (for example, company executives). The two problems that agency theory addresses are: 1.) the problems that arise when the desires or goals of the principal and agent are in conflict, and the principal is unable to verify (because it difficult and/or