Physicalism

that physics is not able to explain consciousness. First, I will explain how Chalmers uses the idea of philosophical zombie to overthrow the basis of physicalism, and then I will present an argument against Chalmers’ solution. Ultimately I will offer a counter-argument that Chalmers might respond with, concluding that Chalmers’ argument against physicalism succeeds. In the philosophical sense, a zombie is an exact physical duplicate of a person without any experiential consciousness. Therefore it has

John Jamieson Carswell "Jack" Smart was an Australian philosopher. He was a prominent figure in the development of philosophical thinking in his continent. He published papers on various philosophical matters including Metaphysics, Ethics and Philosophy of mind. Regarding his study in the philosophy of mind, in 1950, JJC Smart was one of the fathers of the Mind-Brain Identity Theory, whose central claim was that particular states of the mind are similar to particular states of the brain. He believes

Functionalism as Non-Reductive Physicalism As a human beings we have beliefs, desires, emotion and other ‘mental states;’ and our bodies seems to react to those mental states; for instance, if I have the belief that Wynton Marsalis will play a show, I will move my body to get the tickets before sold out. However the identification of this belief as a mental state with a brain state in terms of the identity theory shall suggest that all the people that may go to the show is in the same brain state

In this essay I will discuss Frank Jackson’s knowledge argument against physicalism inside the mind-body problem. First, allow me to explain what the mind-body problem is. In ancient philosophy, mind and body were named as one of the most famous cases of dualisms, such as monism versus pluralism or the ephemeral versus eternal. Nowadays, when seen together, they are centered more on the concept of the mind rather than anything else. The information contained in the mind, being different from the

A further criticism against the Cartesian dualism is that it seems to be committing the “Masked Man Fallacy”, which can be outlined as follows: someone knows who John is, but he/she is at a party and sees a masked man who he/she doesn’t know. Under Leibniz’s Law, for John and the masked man to be identical they ought to have the same properties, which isn’t the case, as he/she knows who John is and doesn’t know who the masked man is. So, he/she thinks that the two are different people for this mere

They Identity theory is a creation from the main philosophical branch “Materialism” established as a response to development of psychology and its correlation to the physical sciences in the mid-20th century. The doctrine essentially proposes that types (or kinds, or classes) of mental states (M) are identical with types (or kinds, or classes) of physical states (P) such that M=P. Advocates of this theory propose that this assertion is a dependent element in regards to the nature of the mind and

to conclude that physicalism must be false” but then goes on to add, “physicalism is a position we cannot understand because we do not at present have any conception of how it might be true.” Even though the claims appear mutually exclusive and Nagel states that physicalism is incomprehensible, Nagel’s claims are able to be simultaneously true and his conditions for understanding physicalism are improper. In What Is It Like to Be a Bat? Nagel states the definition of physicalism is that “mental states

ask. The belief that the mind and body are one entity is defined as monism. Physicalism is a monism. Those that believe in the idea of physicalism also believe that mind and body are not separate substances. Physicalism claims that the mind is something that is physical. It also claims that the mind is reduced to or identified with behavior. According to the website, philosophy basics, “those that believe in physicalism believe that everything that exists is no more extensive than its physical properties

“What is it like to be a bat?” Thomas Nagel argues that physicalism cannot possibly account for consciousness and quaila, or qualitative states. The objection in his article is target the flaws of both functionalism and physicalism with emphasis on the importance of consciousness and its subjective nature. In this paper, I will argue on Nagel’s argument but also focus on how a functionalist can respond to his objection. To explain what physicalism or functionalism stand for in philosophy, I will introduce

different ways of explaining how the mind and body do interact casually. Dualism is the theory that the mind and body are sperate things and they can interact casually. This theory says that nonphysical things can interact with physical things. Physicalism is the theory that humans can be adequately explained by physical or material components. This theory says that the mind is a physical thing instead of nonphysical. Functionalism is the theory that the mind is categorized by patterns of input-processing-output