The fraternity is electing a national president and there are four candidates: Alberto (A), Bate (B), Carl (C), and Dave (D). The voter preferences are:    (CADB) 93 (CABD) 113 (DABC) 123 (BADC) 143   Who wins the election using the Hare method? Does this violate the Condorcet criterion?

Consider an election with three candidates with the results:   (CBA) 2 (ACB) 6 (BAC) 5 (BCA) 2   Is there a majority winner? If not, who is the plurality winner? Answer No, B; Yes, A; No, A; No, C; or Yes, B.   Who wins the election using the Borda count method? Answer B; A; C and B tie; C; or A and B tie.   Who wins if they first eliminate the one with the most last-place votes and then have a runoff between the other two? Answer B; A; C and B tie; C; or A and B tie.   Could the two voters with preference (BCA) change the outcome of the election in previous question if they voted insincerely and pretended to have the preference (BAC)? Answer yes or no.

The U.S. Census Bureau conducts annual surveys to obtain information on the percentage of the voting-age population that is registered to vote. Suppose that 713 employed persons and 613 unemployed persons are independently and randomly selected and that 338 of the employed persons and 244 of the unemployed persons have registered to vote. Can we conclude that the percentage of employed workers ( p1 ), who have registered to vote, exceeds the percentage of unemployed workers ( p2 ), who have registered to vote? Use a significance level of α=0.1 for the test.   Step 1 of 6 :   State the null and alternative hypotheses for the test. Step 2 of 6 :   Find the values of the two sample proportions, pˆ1p^1 and pˆ2p^2. Round your answers to three decimal places.     Step 3 of 6 :   Compute the weighted estimate of p, p‾p‾. Round your answer to three decimal places. Step 4 of 6 :   Compute the value of the test statistic. Round your answer to two decimal places.…

An election is held among four candidates (A, B, C, and D).  Using a voting method we will call the "Yoshida Method ", the winner of the election is candidate A.  Due to an irregularity in the original vote count a new election must be held. In the new election nearly everyone resubmitted the same preferences.  There were three voters, whoever, who changed their ballots.  In the original election they voted "D first, then A second, then B third, then C last," but in the second election they promoted A to vote "A first, D second, B third, C last."   In the recount, still using voting method X, candidate B wins the election.  Based on the above information, we have just witnessed that the Yoshida Method violates the _______ criterion. Group of answer choices Condorcet Criterion Monotonicity Criterion Independence-of-Irrelevant-Alternatives Criterion (IIA) None of the fairness criteria are violated Majority Criterion

The UCLA Graduate Student Association can use an instant runoff or a Bordacount method (but not both) when there are three or more candidates for office. The currentElection Board has up to 16 voters. Suppose three candidates are up for the Office of OfficialAwesomeness (Hey, give me a break - this is the last question!) Iris (I), Orchid (O), and Violet(V).(a) How many different preferences are possible?

Why is it impossible, with an odd number of voters, to have two distinct candidates win the same election using Condorcet's method.

Consider an election with 301 voters cast for 3 candidates. What is the smallest number of first-place votes that a candidate can receive to win by the Plurality method?

Consider an election with three candidates with the following results: (ACB) 2, (BAC) 5, (CBA) 4, (CAB) 2. a) Is there a Majority winner? If not who is the Plurality winner. b) who wins using the Borda count method? c) Who wins if he or she first eliminates the one with the most Las place votes and then has a runoff between the other two?

Use Hare System to determine the winner of the following election: Number of Voters (21) 6 B First Second Third Fourth 7 A B C D A C D 5 C B A D 3 D с B A Now, modify the ballot on the far right (with 3 voters) so that the winner is in First place. Does the winning candidate still win? What can we conclude from this about the Hare System?