i need part D and E Search frictions and the gender gap. Consider the following version of the search model of thelabor market by Burdett and Mortensen (1998). There are two labor markets, one for men (m) andone for women (f). On one side of the m labor market, there is a continuum of male workers withmeasure 1. Each worker has preferences described by the lifetime utility E B*c4, where 3 denotesthe worker's discount factor and c denotes the worker's consumption in period t, which is equal tob if the worker is unemployed and w if the worker is employed. On the other side of the m labormarket, there is a continuum of firms. Each firm maximizes the present value of profits discountedat the factor 3. Assume 3 = 1. Workers and firms come together through a decentralized processof search. In particular, a worker finds a firm with probability A when unemployed and A" whenemployed. Assume X = X" = Am. When a worker meets a firm, it observes the wage of the firm anddecides whether to join the firm or not. If he does, he produces y units of output per period until he2.either finds a better job or he is forced into unemployment (an event which happens with probabilityổ per period). The labor market f is the same as the labor market m, except that X = x = x, withdg < Am-Write down and compare the reservation wage for men, Rm, and for women, Rf. Discuss your findings.a.b.Write down the equilibrium wage offer distributions Fm(w) and F;(w) in the labor markets m andf. Compute the difference between F,(w) and F;(w). What does the sign of the difference tell youabout the wages offered to men and women?Write down the equilibrium wage distributions G„(w) and Gj(w) in the labor markets m and f.Which is greater: G„(w) or Gj(w)? And what does this say about the wages earned by men andwomen?d.. Imagine that a no-discrimination law is introduced by Congress, forcing firms to offer the same wagesto women as to men, i.e. F;(w) = Fm(w). Compute the wage distributions Gm(w) and Gf(w) for menand women. Are they equal? Explain your findings.Did the no-discrimination policy succeed in reducing gender inequality?е.

The period "no-discrimination law" refers to law or prison provisions that prohibit discrimination…

Answered: wage distributions

Business

Economics

wage distributions

Microeconomic Theory

12th Edition

ISBN:9781337517942

Author:NICHOLSON

Publisher:NICHOLSON

Chapter17: Capital And Time

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 17.13P

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In the figure below, which represents how the labor/leisure choice of a consumer changes when the wage rate increases to w' > w, the substitution effect is zero and the overall income effect is positive (in the figure, x represent the amount of leisure). A. True B. False motivate it with a short comment (max 4 lines). 24w' Py (w' > w) 24w C Py A = B BLa L 24
Which of the following preference doesn't satisfy monotonicity? O Quasilinear preference O Perfect substitutes preference Bads O Cobb-Douglas Preference
The most general form of a social welfare function (SWF ) can be written as W = W(U1; ... ; UH). a. Explain the following properties that a SWF may satisfy: non paternalism, Pareto principle, anonymity (the names of the agents do not matter), and concavity (aversion to inequality). b. Consider two agents h = 1; 2 with utilities U1 and U2. Depict the social indifference curve of the utilitarian SWF in (U1; U2)-space. Which of the properties in part a does it satisfy? c. Depict the social indifference curves of the maxim in or Rawlins SWF. Contrast to the utilitarian SWF with respect to the aversion to inequality. Which properties does the Rawlins SWF satisfy? d. The Bernoulli-Nash social welfare function is given by the product of individual utilities. Discuss the distributional properties of the Bernoulli-Nash SWF.
Question 6 Unsaved DD 24 D B E BL₁ с BL₂ GOOD 1 If bundle A is chosen on BL₁ and bundle C is chosen on BL2 then: We can say that bundle C is revealed preferred to bundle A. We cannot make a comparison between bundles A and C. We can say that this consumer is not satisfying WARP. We can say that bundle A is revealed preferred to bundle C.
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