Use the following normal-form game to answer the questions below. Player 2 Player 1 O(B.C) O (A,D) a. Identify the one-shot Nash equilibrium. O (A,C) O (B,D) O Yes O No strategy A 60, 60 30, 130 b. Suppose the players know this game will be repeated exactly three times. Con they achieve payoffs that are better than the one- shot Nash equilibrium? O Yes O No D 130, 30 80, 80 c. Suppose this game is Infinitely repeated and the interest rate is 6 percent. Can the players achieve payoffs that are better than the one-shot Nash equilibrium? O Yes O No d. Suppose the players do not know exactly how many times this game will be repeated, but they do know that the probability the game will end after a given play is 8 Ir8 is sufficiently low, can players earn more than they could in the one-shot Nash equilibrium?

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