Use the figure below to answer the following question.   If the output level is Q1, then deadweight loss is indicated by the area       Multiple Choice   ecf.   0abe.   bce.   0eQ1.

Suppose 20 people each have the demand Q = 20 - Pfor streetlights, and 5 people have the demand Q = 18 - 2P for streetlights. The cost of building each streetlight is $10. If it is impossible to purchase a fractional number of streetlights, how many streetlights are socially optimal?

Please label the graph point where the socially optimal equilibrium is

3Q6Q7Q8: all questions have a correlation towards each other. Use the following to complete them.

Consider the market for trees in a public park. These trees are a public good that give benefits to multiple groups of people, as described below. Each Marginal Willingness to Pay curve represents the aggregation of all the individuals in that group, and those groups make decisions collectively. Additionally, the cost of planting trees is given. Consider Q to be the number of trees in the park. Note that no one is ever worse off from additional trees.   Arborists: MWTP = 2000 – 5Q                                  Total WTP = 2000Q - 2.5Q2 Environmentalists: MWTP = 1500 – 10Q                 Total WTP = 1500Q – 5Q2 Casual Park Visitors: MWTP = 800 – 10Q                Total WTP = 800Q – 5Q2 Park Haters: MWTP = 500 – 50Q                              Total WTP = 500Q – 25Q2 MC = 1400                                                                  Total Cost = 1400Q   (a) If the government does not intervene into the market, how many trees will be planted? (b) What is the socially…

You have conducted a study to determine if there is independence or dependence between market segments (A-C) and prices the segments are willing to pay for a product.  The following cross tabular output appears.         Under $10  $11-$15  over $15     All   A             50       30        20     100            50.00    30.00     20.00             33.33    27.27     50.00              16.67    10.00      6.67              50.00    36.67     13.33            0.000    1.212     3.333   B             40       50        10     100            40.00    50.00     10.00             26.67    45.45     25.00              13.33    16.67      3.33              50.00    36.67     13.33            2.000    4.848     0.833   C             60       30        10     100            60.00    30.00     10.00             40.00    27.27     25.00              20.00    10.00      3.33              50.00    36.67     13.33            2.000    1.212     0.833   All          150      110        40     300…

Suppose the Social Welfare Function is given by U = X0.25Y0.75 and the PPF is given by: X2+Y2 = 100, solve for X* and Y*

The proposition that problems of externalities will be resolved efficiently through private exchange is known as Property rights Pollution abatement Coase theorem Tort law

Consider two groups of citizens, each group can either choose to drive x = d or to take public transport x = p. The first group, group 1, enjoys driving and has the following 3 benefit from using their car within the ULEZ area: B1(x1 = d) = 18. The second group, group 2, does not enjoy driving and has a benefit of B2(x2 = d) = 0 from driving their car. If they don’t drive, citizens can use public transport to get around. The benefit of doing so is the same for both groups: B1(x1 = p) = B2(x2 = p) = 10. Both groups drive cars that do not meet the ULEZ requirements and therefore create excessive pollution.    For simplicity, we consider that pollution, and the health problems it induces, are the main cost of driving. This cost is imposed on both groups and is equal to Ci(x1 = d, x2 = d) = 10 if both groups drive, Ci(x1 = p, x2 = d) = Ci(x1 = d, x2 = p) = 5 if only one group drives and Ci(x1 = p, x2 = p) = 0 if neither group drives, where i represents either group 1 or group 2. The…

Consider two groups of citizens, each group can either choose to drive x = d or to take public transport x = p. The first group, group 1, enjoys driving and has the following 3 benefit from using their car within the ULEZ area: B1(x1 = d) = 18. The second group, group 2, does not enjoy driving and has a benefit of B2(x2 = d) = 0 from driving their car. If they don’t drive, citizens can use public transport to get around. The benefit of doing so is the same for both groups: B1(x1 = p) = B2(x2 = p) = 10. Both groups drive cars that do not meet the ULEZ requirements and therefore create excessive pollution.    For simplicity, we consider that pollution, and the health problems it induces, are the main cost of driving. This cost is imposed on both groups and is equal to Ci(x1 = d, x2 = d) = 10 if both groups drive, Ci(x1 = p, x2 = d) = Ci(x1 = d, x2 = p) = 5 if only one group drives and Ci(x1 = p, x2 = p) = 0 if neither group drives, where i represents either group 1 or group 2. The…